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Abstract
The recent European sovereign-debt crisis has made it clear that exposures
towards sovereigns contain credit risk. However, according to the Basel frame-
work’s standardized approach banks are not required to hold any regulatory cap-
ital for highly rated sovereigns. In response, this thesis develops a shadow rating
approach model for sovereign probability of default estimation, subsequently
determining economic capital for sovereign exposures within a foundation in-
ternal ratings-based framework. Furthermore, the empirical Bayes estimator is
utilized for low-default portfolio probability of default calibration. The model
is tested on five homogeneous sub-segments in addition to the entire dataset
at hand. Empirical findings suggest that the full dataset performs adequately
overall. Nonetheless, model performance is superior for accurately constructed
sub-segments. In addition, economic, monetary and political indicators as well
as banking sector health are found to best replicate S&P’s sovereign long-term
issuer credit ratings.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In the last decade, credit risk has increasingly become one of the major research
fields in quantitative finance. The amount of traded credit derivatives has risen
substantially since the mid-1990s, when interest grew within academia in terms
of developing techniques for modeling and managing credit risk. Consequently,
with the increasingly complex financial markets and the implications of the reg-
ulatory Basel Framework, sophisticated credit risk models have become essential
to financial institutions (Trueck and Rachev 2009, p. XI).
As of late, financial institutions and regulatory bodies have paid considerable
attention to sovereign credit risk measurement. The recent European sovereign-
debt crisis has made it clear that exposures towards sovereigns contain credit
risk. The main area of focus has in particular been GIIIPS exposures, i.e.
towards Greece, Italy, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. Prior to the crisis,
investments in sovereign bonds were perceived as more or less risk-free, and it
is only recently defaults to “advanced economies” were thought possible. The
crisis has indeed contributed to a loss of confidence in sovereign debt amongst
investors, and strongly impacted its risk-free status on financial markets.
Historically, financial theory has been based upon the existence of a risk-free
asset, dating back to the groundbreaking capital-asset pricing model and modern
portfolio theory introduced by Harry Markowitz in the 1950s. Nonetheless,
the cruel reality is that there simply does not exist assets that are completely
exempted from risk.
The fact that exposures were seen as free from default-risk is reflected in the first
regulatory Basel Framework from 1988, Basel I, which set a zero percentage risk
weighting for exposures to OECD sovereigns. In other words, banks were not
required to hold any capital for exposures to OECD sovereigns. This was later
modified in Basel II from 2004, in which financial institutions were required to
hold capital in proportion to their risk exposures, and the use of internal rating
models was introduced (Benzin et al. 2003, pp. 3-7).
Even though sovereign-debt crises are not uncommon in modern history, sovereign
defaults remain a rarity in comparison to the number of corporate defaults,
which is depicted in figure 1. Considering the lack of observed sovereign de-
faults historically, the task of implementing and integrating sound sovereign
credit risk management into financial institutions becomes a complex matter.
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Figure 1: Historical sovereign default frequency (Tomz and Wright 2012)
The main area of research regarding sovereign-debt crises, prior to the Euro-
zone crisis, was focused on emerging markets (Joffe 2012, p. 357). Nevertheless,
the recently increased awareness of sovereign credit risk has stimulated assess-
ment and development of Basel II internal ratings-based modeling practices for
Eurozone sovereigns.
1.2 Problem Discussion and Purpose
The issue of estimating economic capital towards sovereign exposures relates
to the fact that banks no longer prefer to apply Basel framework’s standard-
ized approach, which exhaustively relies on external ratings published by credit
rating agencies (CRA). Similarly, calculating capital for credit risk exposures
towards externally unrated sovereigns and municipals is a topic that requires ad-
dressing. Financial institutions preferably solve these difficulties by developing
models according to the internal ratings-based methodology.
With that said, the purpose of the thesis is to estimate economic capital (EC) for
sovereign exposures within a foundation internal ratings-based (FIRB) frame-
work. In detail, the objective is to develop a model estimating a sovereign’s
probability of default (PD), based on both quantitative and qualitative factors
according to the shadow rating approach. In terms of selecting quantitative and
qualitative factors, current sovereign credit risk methodologies of CRA Stan-
dard & Poor’s (S&P’s) as well as financial service company Bloomberg will act
as benchmark methodologies.
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Additionally, it is of interest to explore and discuss which practices are most
suited for sovereign credit risk measurement, and also see if there exist other
academically respected practices for sovereign exposures which may not be as
suitable from an economic capital perspective.
This thesis consists firstly of an overview of sovereign credit risk and charac-
teristics of sovereign entities, the Basel framework for IRB models, sovereign
credit risk modeling aspects as well as PD calibration of low-default portfolios
(LDP). Next, benchmark methodologies are examined in sufficient detail, and
the rating model development methodology thoroughly presented. Ultimately,
the model’s features and performance are extensively analyzed and discussed.
1.3 Delimitations
Firstly, given the time constraints involved and the range a master’s thesis is
expected to cover, all current academic research within sovereign credit risk
measurements will not be explored in-depth. Therefore, the shadow rating ap-
proach is selected, since it is considered as best practice for LDPs according to
banks and CRAs.
Secondly, the model developed holds under the Basel FIRB framework, in which
EC calculations are mainly based on the estimation of one parameter, namely
PD. Therefore, it is obvious to limit the study to PD estimation. Other com-
ponents required to compute EC will be set to the FIRB framework’s set of
predefined values.
Thirdly, taking the recent European sovereign-debt crisis into account, it is of
primary interest to evaluate sovereigns within the EU and sovereigns in close
geographical proximity. Hence, data from a selection of relevant sovereigns is
used.
Additionally, only brief testing is applied when validating the model, since a
thorough model validation process is not the main purpose of this thesis, and
may well serve as a separate thesis topic.
1.4 Previous Research
The origin to bankruptcy risk modeling traces back to Edward Altman’s pio-
neering Z-Score model published in 1968, which predicted corporate defaults
using financial statement data. CRAs Moody’s and S&P’s later commercialized
Altman’s methodologies, acknowledging its robustness and validity for assessing
corporate PDs (Joffe 2012, p. 354).
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In regards to the history of sovereign risk modeling, Gray (2009, pp. 118-121)
has compiled a brief overview of the models developed by researchers over the
last decades. Gray (2009) initially refers to the work of Kindleberger (1978),
which analyzes the history of financial crises and spillovers over the past 300
years. Kindleberger (1978) makes use of a model developed by Hyman Minsky,
incorporating ideas of profound economists such as John Stuart Mill, Alfred
Marshall and Irving Fisher. In the Minsky model, both investments in assets,
such as real estate and stocks, and borrowers’ indebtedness increase in economic
upturns, eventually leading to financial bubbles. If the bubble grows sufficiently
large and causes a change in investors’ behaviour, a dumping of real or financial
assets could possibly trigger a financial crises.
In addition, Gray (2009) arranges historical crisis models into three model gener-
ations. The first-generation models, developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
focus on fundamental economic factors and implications of sovereigns with fixed
exchange rates, i.e. when a currency’s value is fixed towards the development of
another currency. The main idea was that governments are not able to finance
a fiscal deficit by printing money, while simultaneously upholding a credible
fixed exchange rate. Fundamental economic factors also played a major part in
the second model generation, which entered the frame in mid 1990s after the
exchange rate mechanism crisis in 1992 and the Mexican crisis in 1994. One
major feature was the fact that the models allowed for different outcomes, i.e.
the models had multiple equilibria. The third-generation models, created in the
wake of the Asian crises in 1997− 1998, emphasized the importance of banking,
corporate, and government balance sheets. The models sparked researchers to
further investigate factors such as solvency and liquidity issues within a sector,
the role and consequences of government bail-out guarantees to banks, as well
as currency mismatches (Gray 2009, pp. 119-120).
In the 1990s efforts were made to develop models which could signal forthcoming
currency and banking crises, so called early warning systems. Macroeconomic
factors were found to be significant explanatory variables when predicting the
likelihood of a crisis. However, early warning systems performed poorly for
out-of-sample crises, due to the use of backward-looking accounting variables,
and the difficulty of defining a crisis event. Additionally, researchers have ap-
plied contingent claims option analysis when modeling sovereign risk, integrating
them with macroeconomic models such as dynamic stochastic general equilib-
rium or macroeconomic monetary policy models. Gray (2009) also mentions
financial contagion as an area which needs to be taken into account, but has
only received notable attention within the last decade (Gray 2009, pp. 120-121).
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As of late, academia has turned its attention to estimating sovereign PD based
on market pricing. More specifically, several efforts have been put forward
to deriving PDs from sovereign bonds or credit default swap (CDS) spreads.
Remolona et al. (2007) and Longstaff et al. (2011) have presented two papers
on the subject, both commonly cited amongst modern literature.
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2 Theoretical Framework
2.1 Sovereign Credit Risk
The following section aims to provide a deeper knowledge within the area of
sovereign credit risk. Furthermore, sovereign default will be defined, specific
characteristics and drivers of sovereign credit risk as well as impact and costs of
sovereign default will be presented. A brief analysis and comparison of external
sovereign market data will be presented as well.
2.1.1 Defining Sovereign Credit Risk
Banks face several risks, one of which is credit risk. Credit risk is imminent if
for instance a bank grants a loan to a counterparty, and the counterparty fails
to meet its obligations following the loan. In terms of assessing sovereign credit
risk, the first step towards a comprehension of the field is defining the event of
sovereign default, which is not entirely uncomplicated. A common conception
of default involves a sovereign failing to meet an interest or principal payment.
A sovereign may also be perceived as in default if short-term or long-term debt
is unserviced (Text Medic 2013a).
While there is no universally accepted definition, a well-cited document from
CRA Standard and Poor’s (2013b, p. 28) defines sovereign default in the fol-
lowing way:
Standard & Poor’s generally defines default as the failure to meet a principal
or interest payment on the due date contained in the original terms of a debt
issue. Questions can arise, however, when applying this definition in different
situations and to different types of sovereign obligations. Standard & Poor’s
considers a sovereign to be in default under any of the following circumstances:
(i) For local- and foreign-currency bonds, notes, and bills issued by the central
government and held outside the public sector of the country, a sovereign default
occurs when the central government either fails to pay scheduled debt service on
the due date or tenders an exchange offer of new debt with less-favorable terms
than the original issue.
(ii) For local currency issued by the central bank, a sovereign default takes place
when notes are converted into a new currency of less-than-equivalent face value.
(iii) For private-sector bank loans incurred by the central government, a sovereign
default occurs when the central government either fails to pay scheduled debt
service on the due date or negotiates with the bank creditors a rescheduling of
principal or interest at less-favorable terms than in the original loan.
Jedidi (2013, p. 5) discusses S&P’s definition, emphasizing that the measure
of a government’s creditworthiness is dependent on the ability and willingness
to uphold its commitment at due date. A challenging aspect when modeling
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sovereign credit risk is quantifying these two essential aspects. The ability to
pay, whether or not a sovereign is able to meet its obligations, is commonly
measured through quantitative macroeconomic stability factors, such as terms
of GDP or government revenues. The willingness to pay, i.e. having suffi-
cient funds but opting not to repay debt, is however more difficult to quantify.
Therefore, qualitative factors such as historical debt payment culture as well as
transparency and reliability of economic indicators are used. Macroeconomic
factors such as GDP growth and inflation also influence the willingness to pay.
Essentially, a sovereign’s decision whether or not to pay is determined by the
sanctions from a default in comparison to the amount possibly saved from debt
payments. Additionally, Jedidi (2013) does point out that S&P’s definition of
default only incorporates sovereigns that have market access, and are able to
issue government bonds.
2.1.2 Impact and Costs of Sovereign Default
Although there does not exist one general default definition, the common de-
nominator lies in the repercussions of a default. Just as in the case of corporate
defaults, sovereign financial distress results in a full or partial repudiation of
its obligations. However, contrary to a typical corporate case, which outright
defaults, sovereigns instead restructure debt and financial commitments (Text
Medic 2013a). Through restructuring sovereigns reduce debt repayments costs,
but simultaneously succumb to negative impacts on international trades, in-
creased regulatory monitoring, reduced possibility of external financing as well
as reputation effects (Remolona et al. 2007, p. 31). Mene´ndez (2012, p. 2)
cites that sovereigns subject to high levels of interest rates may be forced into
restructuring debt.
Furthermore, Ang and Longstaff (2011, p. 4) list properties where the conse-
quences of sovereign default differs from corporate default. Firstly, corporations
which cancel debt repayments would be forced to render assets to bond holders
in collateral in the event that bondholders decide to litigate. However, in the
case of a sovereign, most of its assets are domestically located within country
boundaries, and in event of default it is not feasible for a sovereign to hand over
these assets. Secondly, in contrast to corporate defaults, there does not cur-
rently exist an internationally acknowledged mechanism for managing sovereign
defaults. Ang and Longstaff (2011) state that the restructuring of international
sovereign debt crises of the 20th Century have all been ad-hoc responses from
large international organs, such as the International Monetary Fund as well as
commercial banks and governments.
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Over the past 200 years, 107 sovereigns have defaulted on at least one occasion,
and most frequently so in emerging markets. However, since the latest emerging
markets debt crises in Latin America in the 1980s, there has been a significant
decrease in default rate amongst EM sovereigns. This fact is evident in figure
1 of historical sovereign default frequency in the introduction chapter. A pos-
sible explanation lies in the fact that EM sovereigns generally have prospered.
Nevertheless, the most interesting conclusion may stem from the fact that it is
no longer preferable to opt to default, in contrast to a few decades back, mainly
due to the reputation risk involved. A history of having a number of defaults
leads to persistent wider spreads in the long term (Text Medic 2013a).
2.1.3 Drivers of Sovereign Credit Risk
Santis (2012, pp. 4-5) has created an overview of the major factors underlying
sovereign risk, namely aggregate risk, country-specific risk and contagion risk,
depicted in figure 2. Aggregate risk, constituted by global factors, is more
specifically related to monetary policy, global uncertainty and risk aversion.
Text Medic (2013a) states that the G10 monetary policy represents a sufficiently
good measure for monetary policy, while the volatility index VIX is suitable
as an indicator for uncertainty and risk aversion. Moreover, the three main
factors affecting country-specific risk are variations in sovereign default risk, a
sovereign’s ability to raise funds in its primary market as well as issues regarding
liquidity in secondary markets. Contagion risk involves the vulnerability to a
contagious spread from one market to another (Santis 2012, pp. 4-5).
10 
Government Debt/GDP Ratios in Emerging Markets 
Source: Roberto A. De Santis,  “The  Euro  Area  Sovereign  Debt  Crisis:  Safe  Haven,  Credit  Rating  Agencies  and  the   
Spread  of  the  Fever  from  Greece,  Ireland  and  Portugal,”  ECB  Working  Paper  Series,  No.  1419  /  February  2012.   
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Figure 2: Determinants of sovereign risk (Santis 2012, p. 32)
Country-specifics are good up to a point, but do not change much between
different periods, while aggregate factors fluctuate more frequently and represent
the primary drivers of short-term sovereign spreads, dominating country-specific
factors in the short run (Text Medic 2013a). Similarly, Longstaff et al. (2011,
p. 77) suggest that global macroeconomic factors heavily influence sovereign
default risk. The study of Ang and Longstaff (2011, p. 19) on system sovereign
credit risk also strongly suggests that the systematic risk component is highly
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correlated with financial markets, rather than country-specific macroeconomic
fundamentals.
Nonetheless, the challenging aspect is identifying quantitative or qualitative
variables which correspond to each of the three main risk factors: aggregate,
country-specific, and contagion risk (Santis 2012, pp. 4-5). Rosenberg and
Singenellore (2013, p. 11) have compiled a list of drivers of sovereign spreads,
listed in table 1.
Country-Specific Global Risk Aversion / G-10 Policies
Government Debt/GDP Ratio U.S. Fed Funds Rate
Budget Deficit/GDP Ratio U.S. 10-Year Yield
Debt Service VIX Index
Relative GDP Growth Baa Corporate/Treasury Yield Spread
Current Account Balance/GDP Ratio MOVE Index
External Debt/GDP Ratio U.S. High-Yield/Treasury Spread
Banking System Fragility (Bank Share
Prices)
G-10 FX Volatility
FX Reserves Bloomberg U.S. Financial Conditions Index
Default History U.S. Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
Per Capita GDP Euro Area Economic Policy Uncertainty Index
Rating Agencies Rating Outlook Contagion - Correlation of Market Returns
Carry/Risk Ratio
Relative Equity Market/Local Bond
Market Performance
CDS Spread
Inflation Performance
Political Risk
Liquidity - Bid/Ask Spread
Table 1: Drivers of sovereigns spreads (Rosenberg and Singenellore 2013, p. 11)
Banking system fragility is listed as one of the drivers in table 1. It is paramount
to note that sovereign risk and the banking sector susceptibility are intercon-
nected, since negative feedback loops exist and may abound. This phenomenon
is depicted in figure 3. For instance, a decrease in asset prices may deteriorate
markets and bank balance sheets, possibly triggering government bailouts and a
rise in government budget deficit, subsequently resulting in widening sovereign
spreads. Reversely, widening spreads impact the banking sector, since banks
own a lot of sovereign debt. As a result, a decrease in bank lending may occur,
leading to weaker GDP growth, which widens sovereign spreads even further
(Text Medic 2013a).
In connection to listed of country-specific drivers by Rosenberg and Singenellore
(2013), Joy (2012, pp. 4-6) examines how macroeconomic factors influence the
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Figure 3: Sovereign risk and banking system interconnection (Rosenberg and
Singenellore 2013, p. 14)
probability of a sovereign defaulting on its sovereign debt. Joy (2012) finds that
high external debt interest payments and large budget deficits constitute the
main macroeconomic factors that drive sovereign default. On a one-year-ahead
predictive power basis, these two measures represent solid signals for default.
What is more, Joy (2012, pp. 4-6) claims that the most significant macroeco-
nomic tipping points of sovereign default is not dependent on fiscal solvency,
but liquidity. For instance, large general government budget deficits represent
a typical fiscal illiquidity tipping point for default. However, the research over
the past decade has produced severely inconsistent results. For instance, the
findings of Kraay and Nehru (2006) point to external liquidity, external solvency
and GDP growth as primary characteristics for sovereign PD estimation. Con-
flictingly, Tomz and Wright (2007) conclude that growth is not essential, stating
that sovereigns have defaulted in the past when having a domestically healthy
economy. Additionally, while Manasse et al. (2003) find a vast amount of factors
driving sovereigns into debt crises, Bandiera et al. (2010) identify the level of
indebtedness as the only macroeconomic characteristic needed to satisfactory
predict default. The lack of consensus regarding key determinants of sovereign
default indicate that there is a large uncertainty regarding the optimal empirical
model within the field.
2.1.4 External Sovereign Market Data
There exist several external market data sources from which sovereign credit
risk can be measured, the most notable include credit ratings and CDS spreads,
but also bond spreads to some extent.
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Bai and Wei (2012, p. 2) pay attention to the advantages of sovereign CDS
spreads in comparison to bond spreads. Firstly, sovereign CDS contracts are
traded in foreign currencies, and as a result investors are protected against
foreign exchange risk and inflation risk. Reversely, government issued bonds
are denominated in domestic currency, and therefore contain foreign exchange
risk and inflation risk. Furthermore, O’Kane (2012, pp. 5-6) notes that CDS
and bond spreads may not follow identical spread paths as a result of the two
financial instruments’ differing currency denotations. In addition, Longstaff
et al. (2011, pp. 76-78) state differences in cash flows between bonds and CDS
contracts induce spread divergence. For instance, CDS contracts do not require
a cash flow at initiation.
Secondly, Bai and Wei (2012, p. 2) mention that CDS contracts are traded on
the OTC (over-the-counter) credit derivative market, where governments cannot
influence market prices in the same way as the market for bonds. In bond mar-
kets, governments are able to manipulate according to their preferences through
buyback schemes, timing of issuance or issuance amount. Contrarily, govern-
ments cannot trade CDS protection on their own bonds, due to the counterparty
risk involved. Thus, sovereign CDS contracts represent a better indicator for
the market’s perception of a sovereign’s credit quality.
Thirdly, Longstaff et al. (2011, pp. 75-76) acknowledge that sovereign CDS
markets generally are more liquid than sovereign bond markets, implying that
CDS spreads are more accurately estimated and quicker to incorporate informa-
tion. However, Joffe (2012, p. 355) states that liquidity still remains an issue
within sovereign CDS contracts, finding that the majority of the contracts were
traded fewer than five times per day in 2009 and 2010. Furthermore, Arezki
et al. (2010, pp. 36-37) highlight that increases of a sovereign’s CDS spread lead
to spill-over effects to other closely related sovereigns. For instance, Greece’s
credit rating downgrade in 2010 not only influenced the cost of insuring Greek
debt, but also the debt of other euro area sovereigns even though their credit
ratings were unchanged.
Moreover, Huberdeau (2013, p. 1) criticizes CDS spreads, arguing that they
have pro-cyclical impact. The property is exemplified as a scenario where a
deteriorating credit rating generates a higher interest rate, which in turn affects
a sovereign’s debt sustainability and ability to obtain new loans. Huberdeau
(2013) also makes a valid point stating that CDS pricing is heavily reliant on
agency ratings, adding to the pro-cyclical characteristic. Likewise, alongside
traditional credit ratings it is becoming more common that rating agencies issue
”CDS-implied ratings”, which further intensifies pro-cyclicality.
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Taking the criticism of CDS markets into consideration, Flannery et al. (2010,
pp. 2085-2087) state that credit ratings have remained the primary source as
indicator of credit risk. “Regulators and investors should not replace one bro-
ken system (credit ratings) with another broken system (CDS)”, Flannery et al.
(2010) acknowledge. Assessing sovereign credit ratings more in detail, there
is a general conception amongst academic research that credit ratings do not
provide fully accurate estimates for sovereign credit risk. Altman and Rijken
(2006, p. 54) cite that rating agencies prefer not to have ratings fluctuating fre-
quently. Swift reversals of ratings tend to negatively affect agencies’ reputation,
even if the rating alterations represent the actual changes in creditworthiness.
Nevertheless, Altman and Rijken (2006) list several sound arguments for rating
stability, both from an investor and regulatory point of view.
2.2 Basel Framework
The Basel framework is a regulatory standard on banking regulation, and all
EU member states hold under the framework. The following section will review
the Basel Framework, and in particular with regards to IRB modeling, PD
and EC for sovereigns. Trueck and Rachev (2009) have compiled a thorough
overview of the Basel II Framework, which will act as a basis. As a side note, the
Basel III Framework which has recently been introduced and is currently under
implementation at financial institutions, will not be reviewed in this chapter.
The Basel II framework consists of three pillars, visualized in figure 4, which
together intend to provide stability to the financial system.
3.1 Overview 33
The
New Basel Capital Accord
(Basel II)
Minimum
Capital
Requirement
First Pillar Second Pillar Third Pillar
Supervisory
Review
Process
Market
Discipline
FIGURE 3.1. The three pillars of the new Basel Capital Accord.
introduced focusing on trading risks and allowing some banks for the first
time to use their own systems to measure their market risks. The new
framework provides a spectrum of approaches from simple to advanced
methodologies for the measurement of both credit risk and operational
risk in determining capital levels. Therefore, due to the less prescriptive
guidelines of the new accord, capital requirements should be more in line
with underlying risks and allow banks to manage their businesses more eﬃ-
ciently. Thus, credit ratings and the estimation of probabilities of default
are major input variables for the new Accord.
The new Accord consists of three mutually reinforcing pillars, which
together contribute to safety and soundness in the financial system.
Figure 3.1 displays the three pillars: minimum capital requirements, super-
visory review process, and market discipline. The Committee stresses the
need for a rigorous application of all three pillars and plans to achieve the
eﬀective implementation of all aspects of the Accord.
3.1.1 The First Pillar—Minimum Capital Requirement
The first pillar sets out the minimum capital requirements and defines the
minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. Therefore, it is necessary
to know how the total capital is adequately measured by banks. The new
framework maintains both the current definition of the total capital and
the minimum requirement of at least 8% of the bank’s capital to its risk
weighted assets (RWA).
Capital Ratio =
Total Capital
Credit Risk +Market Risk + Operational Risk
(3.1)
Figure 4: The three pillars of the Basel II framework (Trueck and Rachev 2009,
p. 33)
The first pillar contains guidelines on minimum capital requirements for market,
credit and operational risk, and is of main interest when estimating EC. Fur-
thermore, the pillar presents two central approaches to measuring credit risk,
namely the standardized (STD) approach and the IRB approach, visualized in
figure 5. Additionally, the IRB approach offers two sub-approaches, the FIRB
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approach and the advanced IRB approach (AIRB) (Trueck and Rachev 2009,
p. 34).
34 3. The New Basel Capital Accord
Credit Risk Approaches in Basel II
Standardized (STD)
Approach
Internal Ratings Based (IRB)
Approach
Foundation
IRB Approach
Advanced
IRB Approach
FIGURE 3.2. Diﬀerent approaches to credit risk measurement in Basel II.
As one can see from formula 3.1, the calculation of the denominator of
the capital ratio is dependent on three diﬀerent forms of risk: credit risk,
market risk, and operational risk. In particular the credit risk measurement
methods are more elaborate than those in the current accord, whereas the
market risk measure remains unchanged. Nevertheless, the new framework
proposes for the first time a measure for operational risk.
For the measurement of credit risk two principal options are proposed
that will briefly be discussed later. The first option is the standardized
(STD) approach and the second the internal ratings based (IRB) approach.
As illustrated in Figure 3.2, the latter oﬀers two diﬀerent options: a foun-
dation and an advanced IRB approach. The use of the IRB approach is
subject to an approval by the supervisors, based on standards established
by the Committee.
The STD Approach: This approach is conceptually the same as the
present Accord, but it is more risk sensitive. The bank allocates a risk
weight to each of its assets and oﬀ-balance-sheet positions and produces
a sum of RWA values. A risk weight of 100% means that an exposure
is included in the calculation of RWA at its full value, which translates
into a capital charge equal to 8% of that value. Similarly, a risk weight of
20% results in a capital charge of 1.6% (i.e., 20% of 8%). Individual risk
weights currently depend on the broad category of the borrowers, which
are sovereigns, banks, and corporates. Under the new Accord, the risk
weights are refined by the reference to a rating provided by an external
credit assessment institution (ECAI), such as rating agencies described in
the previous chapter. For example, for corporate lending, the old Accord
provided only one risk weight category of 100%, while the new Accord
provides four categories: 20%, 50%, 100%, and 150%.
The IRB Approach: Under this approach, banks are allowed to use
their internal estimates of borrower creditworthiness to assess credit
risk in their portfolios, subject to strict methodological and disclosure
Figure 5: Credit risk approaches in Basel II (Trueck and Rachev 2009, p. 34)
2.2.1 Standardized Approach
Out of the two main approaches the STD approach is the less complex one, as
it relies exhaustively on long-term external ratings published by CRAs. Under
the STD approach, financial institutions allocate a risk weight to each asset and
off-balance-sheet position by using the measure of risk-weighted assets (RWA).
The RWA is calculated as RWA = E · r, where E is the value of the exposure
and r is the risk weight of the exposure. The risk weights for sovereigns, with
notation of S&P’s, are listed in t ble 2 (Trueck and Rach v 2009, p. 37).
External Rating Risk Weights
AAA to AA- 0%
A+ to A- 20%
BBB+ to BBB- 50%
BB+ to B- 100%
Below B- 150%
Unrated 100%
Table 2: Risk weights for sovereigns, notation of S&P’s (Trueck and Rachev
2009, p. 33)
Furthermore, the first pillar defines the ratio of regulatory capital to RWA, with
a minimum requirement of 8%. In other words, a bank must hold at least 8%
of its capital in relation to its RWA:
Capital Ratio =
Total Regulatory Capital
RWA
≥ 8% (2.1)
For example, an exposure to a ’B’-rated sovereign, which is risk weighted at
100%, implicates a capital charge equal to a minimum 8% of the exposure’s full
value. That is, a bank must for this particular exposure hold at least 8% of
the value of the exposure as regulatory capital. Correspondingly, an exposure
with a risk weight of 50% would result in a capital charge equal to at least 4%
(Trueck and Rachev 2009, pp. 33-34).
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The STD approach has received vast criticism for providing regulatory incentives
for banks to accrue large sovereign exposures, and in particular for highly-
rated sovereigns. This stems from the fact that exposures to sovereigns with a
rating between ’AAA’ and ’AA-’ are zero risk weighted according to the STD
approach. However, the IRB approach does not imply a zero risk weighting
when calculating capital charges (Hannoun 2011, pp. 11).
2.2.2 Internal Ratings-Based Approach
In contrast to the STD approach, the IRB approach allows banks to assess
credit risk exposures by using their own internal estimates, subject to approval
by supervisory minimum requirements. The approach is based on four input
parameters, which Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) defines as
follows:
Probability of Default (PD): The probability of an obligor defaulting on a
contractual payment on a one year horizon.
Exposure at Default (EAD): The nominal amount of the exposure.
Loss Given Default (LGD): The actual loss that the bank faces if an obligor
defaults. LGD is commonly denoted as a percentage of EAD.
Maturity (M): The contractual maturity of the exposure.
Moreover, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) states that expected
loss (EL), denoted as a %-figure of EAD, can be calculated from a bottom-up
perspective, using the two risk parameters PD and LGD:
EL = PD · LGD (2.2)
Banks use the measure of EL to forecast the average level of credit losses, which
is marked by the dashed line in figure 6, while losses above EL are called unex-
pected losses (UL). In order to protect banks’ debt holders against peak losses
exceeding EL, capital is needed as a loss-absorbing buffer. Sufficient capital
ensures that the level of UL only exceeds the level of capital by only a very low,
fixed probability (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2005, pp. 2-3).
There are two different options within the IRB approach, namely AIRB and
FIRB. In the FIRB methodology it is sufficient to estimate PD for exposures,
and apply a set of inputs for other parameters predefined by supervisors. For in-
stance, an exposure without collateral LGD is set to either 45% for senior (higher
priority) claims or 75% for subordinated (lower priority) exposures. Contrarily,
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While it is never possible to know in advance the losses a bank will suffer in a particular year, 
a bank can forecast the average level of credit losses it can reasonably expect to 
experience. These losses are referred to as Expected Losses (EL) and are shown in 
Figure 1 by the dashed line. Financial institutions view Expected Losses as a cost 
component of doing business, and manage them by a number of means, including through 
the pricing of credit exposures and through provisioning.  
One of the functions of bank capital is to provide a buffer to protect a bank’s debt holders 
against peak losses that exceed expected levels. Such peaks are illustrated by the spikes 
above the dashed line in Figure 1. Peak losses do not occur every year, but when they 
occur, they can potentially be very large. Losses above expected levels are usually referred 
to as Unexpected Losses (UL) - institutions know they will occur now and then, but they 
cannot know in advance their timing or severity. Interest rates, including risk premia, charged 
on credit exposures may absorb some components of unexpected losses, but the market will 
not support prices sufficient to cover all unexpected losses. Capital is needed to cover the 
risks of such peak losses, and therefore it has a loss-absorbing function. 
The worst case one could imagine would be that banks lose their entire credit portfolio in a 
given year. This event, though, is highly unlikely, and holding capital against it would be 
economically inefficient. Banks have an incentive to minimise the capital they hold, because 
reducing capital frees up economic resources that can be directed to profitable investments. 
On the other hand, the less capital a bank holds, the greater is the likelihood that it will not be 
able to meet its own debt obligations, i.e. that losses in a given year will not be covered by 
profit plus available capital, and that the bank will become insolvent. Thus, banks and their 
supervisors must carefully balance the risks and rewards of holding capital. 
There are a number of approaches to determining how much capital a bank should hold. The 
IRB approach adopted for Basel II focuses on the frequency of bank insolvencies2 arising 
from credit losses that supervisors are willing to accept. By means of a stochastic credit 
portfolio model, it is possible to estimate the amount of loss which will be exceeded with a 
small, pre-defined probability. This probability can be considered the probability of bank 
insolvency. Capital is set to ensure that unexpected losses will exceed this level of capital 
                                                
2  Insolvency here and in the following is understood in a broad sense. This includes, for instance, the case of 
the bank failing to meet its senior obligations. 
Figure 6: Realized losses over time and credit risk loss distribution (Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervisio 2005, p. 2)
the AIRB optio permits banks o implement m dels to estimate each input
risk paramet r (Trueck and Rachev 2009, pp. 41-42).
2.2.3 IRB Formulas and Economic Capital
In previous sections we have defined capital requirements as a measure of regu-
latory capital. However, one needs to note that regulatory capital and EC differ
slightly in their respective definitions. While regulatory capital implies the min-
imum capital requirements set by regulators, EC represents a bank’s internal
capital estimate, denoted in currency amount. EC is commonly used to manage
risks across the entire portfolio of assets as well as making strategic decisions
(Elizalde and Repullo 2006, p. 1). Mausser and Rosen (2007, pp. 681) focus
more detailedly on economic credit capital, which purpose is to absorb large
unexpected losses (UL) specifically linked to credit events of obligors, includ-
ing defaults, credit migrations (up- or downgrades) and credit spread changes.
Nonetheless, capital calculations for regulatory capital and EC are performed
equivalently under the IRB framework, and therefore we will not discriminate
between the two terminologies.
For sovereign exposures, there are a set of IRB formulas for which asset correla-
tion R, maturity adjustment b, capital requirement K, and risk-weighted assets
RWA are calculated. The derivation of the formulas is provided in Trueck and
Rachev (2009, pp. 43-50) for the curious reader.
R = 0.12 · 1− exp(−50 · PD)
1− exp(−50) + 0.24 ·
(
1− 1− exp(−50 · PD)
1− exp(−50)
)
(2.3)
b = (0.11852− 0.05478 · ln(PD))2 (2.4)
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K = LGD ·
(
Φ
(
Φ−1(PD) +
√
R · Φ−1(0.999)√
1−R
)
− PD
)
· 1 + (M − 2.5) · b
1− 1.5 · b (2.5)
RWA = K · 12.5 · EAD (2.6)
With regard to the formula for capital requirement K, Φ is the standard normal
distribution, Φ−1 (PD) represents the inverse of the standard normal distribu-
tion applied to PD in order to derive the default threshold, Φ−1 (0.999) is the
inverse of the standard normal distribution applied to the 99.9% confidence level,
and the term outside the brackets is the maturity adjustment factor (Basel Com-
mittee on Banking Supervision 2006, pp. 63-64). The confidence level of 99.9%
is set by supervisory authorities in order to protect against model uncertainties
and estimation errors of risk factors such as PD, LGD and EAD (Munniksma
2006, p. 29).
Intuitively, the asset correlation R declines with increasing PD. In other words,
as PD of a sovereign increases, the sovereign becomes less dependent on aggre-
gate factors, and consequently more affected by country-specifics (Trueck and
Rachev 2009, p. 46).
Regarding maturity, it is considered as an explicit risk component under the IRB
framework, in order to reflect potential credit quality deterioration of credits
with longer maturities. Empirical evidence also indicate that long-term credit
exposures hold more risk than short-term exposures (Munniksma 2006, p. 28).
RWA is determined by the capital required times 12.5, resulting from the fact
that the required capital is 8% of RWA.
If we revise the part within the brackets from formula for capital requirement,
equation 2.5, and extract LGD, we obtain a formula for UL:
UL = LGD · Φ
(
Φ−1(PD) +
√
R · Φ−1(0.999)√
1−R
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
EL+UL
−LGD · PD︸ ︷︷ ︸
EL
(2.7)
Conclusively, the required capital is based exclusively on UL, and not the sum
of EL and UL Trueck and Rachev (2009, p. 50). Figure 7 illustrates how the
credit risk loss distribution relates to UL and EL.
In terms of actually utilizing the IRB formulas, table 3 illustrates the resulting
risk weights and required capital from a set of PD levels. Since the required
capital is denoted in % of EAD, EC can be calculated by multiplying the required
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with only this very low, fixed probability. This approach to setting capital is illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
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The curve in Figure 2 describes the likelihood of losses of a certain magnitude. The area 
under the entire curve is equal to 100% (i.e. it is the graph of a probability density). The curve 
shows that small losses around or slightly below the Expected Loss occur more frequently 
than large losses. The likelihood that losses will exceed the sum of Expected Loss (EL) and 
Unexpected Loss (UL) - i.e. the likelihood that a bank will not be able to meet its own credit 
obligations by its profits and capital - equals the hatched area under the right hand side of 
the curve. 100% minus this likelihood is called the confidence level and the corresponding 
threshold is called Value-at-Risk (VaR) at this confidence level. If capital is set according to 
the gap between EL and VaR, and if EL is covered by provisions or revenues, then the 
likelihood that the bank will remain solvent over a one-year horizon is equal to the confidence 
level. Under Basel II, capital is set to maintain a supervisory fixed confidence level. 
So far the Expected Loss has been regarded from a top-down perspective, i.e. from a 
portfolio view. It can also be viewed bottom-up, namely from its components. The Expected 
Loss of a portfolio is assumed to equal the proportion of obligors that might default within a 
given time frame (1 year in the Basel context), multiplied by the outstanding exposure at 
default, and once more multiplied by the loss given default rate (i.e. the percentage of 
exposure that will not be recovered by sale of collateral etc.). Of course, banks will not know 
in advance the exact number of defaults in a given year, nor the exact amount outstanding 
nor the actual loss rate; these factors are random variables. But banks can estimate average 
or expected figures. As such, the three factors mentioned above correspond to the risk 
parameters upon which the Basel II IRB approach is built:  
x probability of default (PD) per rating grade, which gives the average percentage of 
obligors that default in this rating grade in the course of one year 
x exposure at default (EAD), which gives an estimate of the amount outstanding 
(drawn amounts plus likely future drawdowns of yet undrawn lines) in case the 
borrower defaults 
x loss given default (LGD), which gives the percentage of exposure the bank might 
lose in case the borrower defaults. These losses are usually shown as a percentage 
Figure 7: Credit risk loss distribution (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
2005, p. 3)
capi l by EAD. In addition, note that LGD and M assume standard FIRB
input v lues of 45% nd 2.5 year r spectively (Bas l Committee on Banking
Supervision 2006). EAD is set to 1, 000, 000, 000 EUR.
Probability of Default (%) Risk Weight (%) Required Capital (%) Economic Capital (EUR)
0.01 7.53 0.6 6000000
0.02 11.32 0.91 9000000
0.03 14.44 1.16 11600000
0.05 19.65 1.57 15700000
0.1 29.65 2.37 23700000
0.25 49.47 3.96 39600000
0.5 69.61 5.57 55700000
1 92.32 7.39 73900000
2 114.86 9.19 91900000
3 128.44 10.28 102800000
4 139.58 11.17 111700000
5 149.86 11.99 119900000
10 193.09 15.45 154500000
15 221.54 17.72 177200000
20 238.23 19.06 190600000
Table 3: Illustrative IRB risk weights and EC for sovereign exposures. LGD =
45%, EAD = 1, 000, 000, 000 EUR, M = 2.5 years.
2.2.4 Minimum Requirements under IRB Approach
When developing a rating model within the IRB framework, a set of minimum
requirements determined by supervisors must be met. The most significant
requirements for the thesis’ purpose are listed in paragraphs 416 − 417 and
461− 463 in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006, pp. 93-102), and
hold for sovereign, corporate and bank exposures:
• When estimating PD for each rating grade, IRB models must account for
the long-run experience, and also be estimated using one or a combination
of techniques based on internal default experience, mapping to external
data, or statistical default models.
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• Irrespective of which data source is used, the length of the underlying
historical data must correspond to at least one business cycle, i.e. at least
five years.
• The input data must form an intuitive set of predictors, and must be
assessed on accuracy, completeness and appropriateness. Furthermore,
the dataset used to build the model must also be representative for the
bank’s sovereign exposures.
• Banks must adopt a conservative bias when limited data is available, for
instance in the case of LDP.
2.3 Modeling Sovereign Credit Risk
In the following section, various approaches to modeling sovereign credit risk will
be reviewed. Particular attention will be given to the shadow rating approach
(SRA), which represents the adopted modeling methodology when estimating
PD for sovereign exposures.
2.3.1 Overview of Credit Risk Approaches
One of the most frequently used approaches within academic literature is con-
tingent claim analysis models, which are typically found under the category
structural models in figure 8. Contingent claim analysis makes use of the Mer-
ton model and Black and Scholes option pricing theory pioneered in the 1970s,
and was primarily developed for corporation credit valuation (Brandorf and
Holmberg 2010, p. 11). Several researchers however have applied structural
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Figure 8: Spectrum of credit risk measures (Guglielmo 2013, p. 4)
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models to estimate sovereign credit risk. Amongst many others, the most no-
table studies include Gray and Jobst (2011) and Gray et al. (2007). Duyvesteyn
and Martens (2012, p. 1) applied the model to emerging markets sovereigns,
which rendered an underestimation of sovereign credit spreads as well as as-
signing near-zero PDs. A possible explanation might be that structural models
are suitable for PD estimation when balance sheet data is the most reliable and
preferred source of data. Additionally, structural models often lack flexibility
when fitting to a certain spread term structure, making pricing of credit deriva-
tives difficult (Brandorf and Holmberg 2010, p. 13). Due to its drawbacks when
applying to sovereigns, the model will not be taken into further consideration.
An alternative to structural models are CDS-driven reduced-form models, which
in recent years have been given attention. Contrary to structural models, which
have an explicit link between capital structure and PD, reduced-form models
treat defaults as exogenous stochastic events that occur at an unknown time of
default. In other words, default is not dependent on items of the balance sheet,
and instead is a stochastic variable (Bomfim 2005, p. 183). Although structural
models may have a clearer economic intuition, reduced-form models fit data
better (Bomfim 2005, p. 199). In addition, two well-cited studies on reduced-
form models are Ang and Longstaff (2011) and Pan and Singleton (2008).
Furthermore, Text Medic (2013b) highlights several modeling approaches for
sovereign default risk, consisting of both qualitative and quantitative approaches.
Scoring models such as Euromoney’s weighted factor scoring model, are typi-
cal qualitative approaches, while discriminant analysis, principal component
analysis, and logit or probit approaches constitute popular quantitative scoring
approaches (Rosenberg and Singenellore 2013, p. 22). Both types of approaches
makes use of quantitative inputs, such as economic, fiscal, monetary and market
factors, as well as qualitative components such as political risk scores. For in-
stance, sovereign methodologies of CRAs rely on a mix of multiple quantitative
and qualitative inputs (Text Medic 2013b).
Continuing to focus on scorecards, Izzi et al. (2011) compile a brief overview of
three major banking practice methodologies used when developing a PD model.
When analyzing small- and medium-sized enterprises or large corporations, a
good/bad analysis or pure expert ranking method is applied respectively. How-
ever, these two methodologies rely on a significant amount of historical default
data, which makes any use of the models inapplicable to LDP segments such
as sovereigns or banks. In contrast, one of the banking practice methodologies
suitable for LDPs is the SRA, which will constitute the main focus throughout
the rest of the section.
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2.3.2 Shadow Rating Approach
The SRA is a commonly used banking practice methodology, applied when there
is an insufficient amount of default data to build a prediction model for internal
EC calculation. The main requirement of the approach is the availability of
external ratings from CRAs for the substantial part of a portfolio. Erlenmaier
(2011, p. 43) recommends long-term, local currency ratings, due to Basel reg-
ulations and measuring transfer risk separately from an obligor’s credit rating.
Additionally, SRA typically utilizes macroeconomic ratios and indicators as well
as qualitative factors (Erlenmaier 2011, pp. 39-40).
In short, one must firstly identify risk factors that represent significant predic-
tors of future default. SRA may then be applied with the objective to weight
the risk factors in order to mimic external ratings using a statistical model.
In order to use SRA for PD estimation, external ratings have to be calibrated
to PDs, i.e. a PD is attached to each external rating grade. In other words,
the objective is to rank sovereigns’ creditworthiness by replicating external rat-
ings, more specifically external rating PDs, using a selection of quantitative and
qualitative risk factors (Erlenmaier 2011, pp. 39-40).
In order to obtain estimates of external PDs which the SRA is based upon,
Erlenmaier (2011, p. 45) suggests the use of annually published historical default
rates from CRAs. Default rates are defined as the annual number of defaults in
relation to the total number of sovereigns within each rating category. However,
these default rates do not provide sufficiently accurate estimates, especially for
highly rated sovereigns which have a zero default rate. This issue is addressed
in detail in section 2.4.
It is also important to note that the observations SRA utilizes are not split into
default and non-defaults, which normally is the case for corporate default anal-
ysis. Instead, SRA follows the external rating scale which consists of multiple
groups, each group corresponding to a rating grade. These grades are ordered
according to creditworthiness, thus providing a finer granularity in comparison
to corporate analysis. Therefore, determining factors with high explanatory
power might be easier. Nevertheless, since SRA is based on external ratings
and not observed defaults, information on the quality of creditworthiness is not
as significant. Moreover, SRA is strongly dependent on the quality of external
ratings, which implies certain limitations (Zaalberg 2013, p. 7). One limitation
mentioned in section 2.1.4 stems from the fact that CRAs prefer rating stability
rather than frequently altering credit ratings.
Next, one may inquire why banks do not utilize external ratings directly, and
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instead apply the SRA by attaching a PD to each rating grade. There are
several incentives for banks to adopt the latter approach:
• In general, CRAs do not provide sufficiently detailed rating methodologies.
Internal models therefore provide additional insight to how ratings are
determined.
• Banks are able to incorporate their own opinion when rating counterpar-
ties, since IRB models allow for rating modifications and expert input.
• Internal models are able to provide ratings for externally unrated expo-
sures.
• The Basel framework encourages the use of IRB approaches, and less
reliance on external ratings (Zaalberg 2013, p. 7).
The SRA methodology will be thoroughly presented in chapter 4.
2.4 PD Calibration of Low-Default Portfolios
Due to the lack of defaults in historical data of sovereigns and in order to
facilitate the use of SRA, the first step is to calibrate a PD scale for external
ratings. The following section will therefore give a brief overview to a number
of PD calibration approaches, as well as a thorough outline of the preferred
Empirical Bayes (EB) estimator methodology.
2.4.1 Overview of PD Calibration Approaches
LDP PD estimation has been given reasonable attention in literature since the
introduction of the Basel II framework. The main concern for supervisors is
the possibility of credit risk being underestimated due to the lack of historical
default data, which effects model development, estimation of parameters and
model validation (Dzidzevicˇiu¯te˙ 2012, p. 132). This is highlighted by the Basel
committee in the IRB minimum requirements stated in section 2.2.4.
The issue of LDP is present when using long-run averages on one-year cumu-
lative default rates (DR) in order to estimate external rating PDs. In reply, a
range of statistical techniques have been applied to enforce sufficiently conser-
vative PD estimates for regulatory capital allocation, such as confidence level
based approaches (Pluto and Tasche (2005)), CAP curve calibration (van der
Burgt (2007)), and marginal of conservatism methodologies (Benjamin et al.
(2006)). Nonetheless, there is no consensus on which technique represents best
practice (Dzidzevicˇiu¯te˙ 2012, p. 134).
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One of the latest contributions to LDP modeling is the Bayesian approach,
which will be the focus of our forthcoming analysis. Bayesian parameter esti-
mation is useful in cases of small samples, providing flexibility in choosing the
prior probability distribution, the possibility of incorporating expert opinion as
well as not producing as conservative estimates as other LDP approaches. The
final argument may sound peculiar, since the aim of LDP modeling is to pro-
duce conservative estimates. However, for instance the confidence level based
approach is known to produce estimates which stakeholders of banks find too
conservative, and are therefore difficult to buy-in (Clifford et al. 2013, p. 17).
2.4.2 Empirical Bayes Estimator
Since data on sovereign default are scarce, PD estimates based purely on sovereign
DR are insufficient for capital allocation according to the Basel framework. In
order to make DR applicable, the EB approach makes use of a data-driven
estimation procedure for the prior probability distribution, which provides ad-
ditional information to PD estimations (Orth 2011, p. 5). Orth (2011) applies
the EB to sovereign PD estimation by using corporate data to estimate the prior
probability distribution. In the following paragraphs, the EB estimator will be
formally defined.
Suppose that all obligors have rating r at time t, t = 1, . . . , T form a cohort.
Further, let Nrt,1 be the number of obligors that constitute the cohort at period
t, and similarly let Nrt,s be the number of obligors that still has not defaulted at
period t+ s or is not censored in the first s− 1 periods. Examples of censored
data are withdrawal of external ratings or gaps in dataset. Moreover, denote
Drt,s as the number of defaults in period t + s, and L
r
t,s be the number of
censored in period t+ s. Define λrs as the marginal default rate, i.e. conditional
on surviving the first s − 1 periods λrs represents the probability of an r-rated
obligor defaulting s periods later (Orth 2011, p. 3).
Suppose there exists G ≥ 2 different groups or rating categories, and that the
marginal DR for each group g, g = 1, . . . , G, are a priori beta distributed and
have the same prior parameters,
λr,gs ∼ beta(αrs, βrs ). (2.8)
Additionally, the conditional distribution of the number of defaults in period s
is binomially distributed,
Dr,gs |λr,gs ∼ Bin(N˜r,gs , λr,gs ). (2.9)
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Note that the notations above in equations 2.8 and 2.9 are somewhat simplified,
where Dr,gs =
∑T
t=1D
r,g
t,s and N˜
r,g
s =
∑T
t=1(N
r,g
t,s −Lr,gt,s/2). N˜r,gs is the adjusted
number of non-defaulted obligors, where Lr,gt,s/2 represents the assumption that
censored obligors have survived on average half of the period (Orth 2011, pp.
4-5).
The framework above is often referred to as the beta-binomial model, and the
beta distribution produces parameters bounded within [0, 1], which is suitable
for PD estimation. One should however note the binomial assumption of con-
ditional independence of default events. Nonetheless, Orth (2011) does provide
evidence that the estimator performs well for data that involves dependencies
through common shocks (Orth 2011, p. 6).
Next, we define the prior mean of λr,gs as µ
r
s =
αrs
(αrs+β
r
s )
, and the prior precision
as τ rs =
1
(1+αrs+β
r
s )
. These two prior parameters are estimated by using Method
of Moments in formulas 2.10 and 2.11. The derivation is found in Kelinman
(1973).
µˆrs =
G∑
g=1
wr,gs
Dr,gs
N˜r,gs
=
G∑
g=1
wr,gs λˆ
r,g
s (2.10)
τˆ rs =
G−1
G
∑G
g=1 w
r,g
s (λˆ
r,g
s −µˆr,gs )2−µˆrs(1−µˆrs)(
∑G
g=1 w
r,g
s (1−wr,gs )/N˜r,gs )
µˆrs(1−µˆrs)(
∑G
g=1(1−1/N˜r,gs )wr,gs (1−wr,gs ))
(2.11)
The weights can be determined in a number of ways. Most simplistically, one
may initially set weights equally wr,gs = 1/G or according to the number of
observations for each group wr,gs = N˜
r,g
s /
∑G
g=1 N˜
r,g
s . However, Kelinman (1973)
proves that inclusion of τˆ rs provides the optimal weights, and proposes the use
of one iteration to re-estimate the prior estimates by setting the weights to
wr,gs =
N˜r,gs
1 + τˆ rs (N˜
r,g
s − 1)
/
G∑
j=1
N˜r,js
1 + τˆ rs (N˜
r,j
s − 1)
. (2.12)
Note also that it is not guaranteed that τˆ rs will be within [0, 1], which is a
necessity. Therefore, τˆ rs is truncated at zero and one (Orth 2011, p. 6).
Having now estimated prior parameters µˆrs and τˆ
r
s , the aim is to reach the
posterior distribution, which is done by applying the Bayesian theorem. The
posterior mean, i.e. the EB estimator for λr,gs , is estimated according to equation
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2.13.
λˆr,gs,EB =
1− τˆ rs
1 + τˆ rs (N˜
r,g
s − 1)
µˆrs +
τˆ rs N˜
r,g
s
1 + τˆ rs (N˜
r,g
s − 1)
λˆr,gs (2.13)
As seen in equation 2.13, the EB estimator is a weighted average of the prior
mean µˆrs, and the marginal default rate estimate λˆ
r,g
s for group g. Furthermore,
the EB estimator brings the marginal default rate estimates closer towards the
prior means, which are equal for all groups g. Additionally, if the number of
observations for each group N˜r,gs increases, the less affect the prior means will
have on the EB estimator, which is intuitively appealing (Orth 2011, p. 7).
Ultimately, PD estimates are produced by applying equation 2.14 to λˆr,gj,EB (Orth
2011, p. 7).
ˆPD
r,g
s,EB = 1−
s∏
j=1
(1− λˆr,gj,EB) (2.14)
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3 Benchmark Methodologies
The following two sections will briefly review two separate sovereign method-
ologies currently in use. Firstly, SRA aims to replicate external ratings, which
naturally propels an assessment of CRA S&P’s sovereign government rating
methodology. Secondly, the purely quantitative based Bloomberg SRSK model
will examined.
3.1 S&P’s Sovereign Government Rating Methodology
Standard and Poor’s (2013c, pp. 3-40) summarize their sovereign government
rating methodology, based upon a foundation of five areas indicating a sovereign’s
willingness and ability to pay. Each area, depicted in figure 9, is determined
by both quantitative and qualitative factors as well as subjective judgment. In
addition to the information listed below, the curious reader is encouraged to
view the URL link found in references for further details within each area.
Figure 9: S&P’s sovereign issuer credit rating framework (Standard and Poor’s
2013c, p. 5)
• Institutional and Governance Effectiveness Score: Primarily depen-
dent on the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of a sovereign’s policy-
making and political institutions. A sovereign’s credit rating may be adjusted
by its perceived debt payment culture and external security risks.
• Economic Score: Key drivers of the economic structure and growth prospects
are income levels, growth prospects, economic diversity, and economic volatil-
ity of a sovereign.
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• External Score: Three factors determine a sovereign’s external liquidity
and internal investment position, namely the status of the currency in in-
ternational transactions, external liquidity and external indebtedness of the
sovereign.
• Fiscal Score: Reflects the fiscal flexibility and performance of a sovereign,
combined with its debt burden and sustainability of deficits. Qualitative
factors do exist in the assessment of revenue and expenditure flexibility, vul-
nerabilities, and long-term trends.
• Monetary Score: A sovereign’s monetary flexibility is analyzed by its ability
to coordinate monetary policy and exchange rate, inflation trends over an
economic cycle, and the development of financial markets as well as debt
markets. Sovereigns part of monetary unions naturally have less flexibility in
relation to sovereigns with an own central bank, which weakens the monetary
score for sovereigns part of monetary unions.
In summary, the key quantitative indicators of S&P’s sovereign rating method-
ology are listed in table 4.
Score Key Indicators
Economic
Monetary
GDP per capita
Real GDP per capita (% change)
Consumer price index (% change)
Depository corporation claims (% change)
Monetary base
External Current account receipts (CAR)
Official reserves
Usable reserves
Gross external financing needs (% of CAR plus usable reserves)
Narrow net external debt/CAR (%)
Current account balance/CAR (%)
Net foreign direct investment (FDI)/GDP (%)
Net external liabilities/CAR (%)
Terms of trade
Fiscal General government
Change in general government debt as a percentage of GDP
Net general government debt/GDP (%)
General government liquid financial assets
Gross general government debt/GDP (%)
General government interest/general government revenues (%)
Table 4: Key quantitative indicators of S&P’s sovereign rating methodology
(Standard and Poor’s 2013c, pp. 39-40)
In addition, Standard and Poor’s (2013a, pp. 8-14) state that external im-
balances associated with public or private sector excesses and political issues,
often are the principal default indicators when rating sovereigns. In terms of
the eurozone, S&P’s believe that external imbalances represent the foundation
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of the recent crisis. What is more, common traits among defaulting sovereigns
are external indebtedness and a weakening currency. Notably, the study indi-
cates that GDP per capita and real economy indicators show mixed features
for defaulting sovereigns. S&P’s study also shows that changes in government
debt represent a more accurate indicator of a decline in creditworthiness than
general government deficits.
Nevertheless, S&P is of the opinion that there simply does not exist one single
measure that consistently acts as adequate indicator for sovereign default. What
makes sovereign default assessment even more challenging is that economic indi-
cators, in particular fiscal and current account deficits, improve prior to default.
One possible explanation might be an inflation rise boosting revenues before ex-
penditures, thus initially easing the fiscal deficit. Additionally, nominal GDP
rises with higher inflation, which improves deficit and debt burden ratios, but
the improvements may not be sustainable (Standard and Poor’s 2013a, p. 14).
One should note that the former Moody’s senior director Joffe (2012, p. 350)
states that credit rating agencies do not apply contemporary and academi-
cally developed techniques, such as logit or probit regression models, to model
sovereign exposures.
3.2 Bloomberg’s SRSK Model
Focusing on Bloomberg’s proprietary sovereign risk model (SRSK), it is based
exhaustively on financial, economic and political risk factors, with no subjective
judgment as in the case of CRA models. The model firstly divides sovereigns into
two types, reserve currency (RC) and non-reserve currency (NRC) sovereigns.
RC sovereigns, such as USA, Japan and EMU members, have debt denominated
in their own currency. On the contrary, NRC sovereigns which do not have
debt denominated in their own currency, are instead required to hold significant
quantities of RC sovereigns’ currencies as foreign exchange reserves (Text Medic
2013b).
In comparison to S&P’s methodology, Bloomberg’s SRSK model only utilizes a
few drivers of sovereign risk, listed in table 5. The main reflection Bloomberg
makes is that RC sovereigns must continually be aware of not only revenues
and debt, but also expenditures. RC sovereigns depend solely on surplus or
deficit, i.e. the quantity available for interest payments. On the other hand,
the focus for NRC countries is a measure of solvency, more specifically the ratio
of currency reserves to external debt. In its denotation of debt, Bloomberg
includes both short-term and a fraction of long-term debt. Additionally, debt
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Reserve-Currency Non-Reserve Currency
Financial Revenues
Expenditures
Debt
Reserves
Debt
Economic GDP Growth
Banking Sector Health
GDP Growth
Banking Sector Health
Political/Social Political Risk Score Political Risk Score
Table 5: Sovereign risk drivers in Bloomberg’s SRSK model (Rosenberg and
Singenellore 2013, p. 25)
and banking sector health in the SRSK model can be seen as a measure of the
ability to pay back debt, while the political risk score measures the willingness
to pay back debt (Text Medic 2013b). The issue of quantifying political risk may
be solved by using qualitative estimates from either the Economist Intelligence
Unit or the PRS Group, which both publish a global political risk index (Text
Medic 2013a).
In comparison to the list of sovereign default risk drivers from Rosenberg and
Singenellore (2013, p. 11) in table 1, Bloomberg’s SRSK model incorporates
significantly fewer factors. Bloomberg motivates this methodology by stating
that factors such as trade deficits, foreign exchange trends and capital flows are
strongly related to the factors in the SRSK model. In a statistical sense, the
model would therefore not benefit from additional factors (Text Medic 2013b).
The SRSK model quantifies a one-year PD range by utilizing a ten-year period
for which all input data is presented. Notably, the model is independent of CRA
and credit market data, and instead of calibrating a CDS model based on CDS
market prices, Bloomberg uses the factors that drive sovereign default risk to
also predict an intrinsic estimate of 5-year CDS contract (Text Medic 2013b).
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4 Rating Model Development
The following section presents each step to developing a rating model, specif-
ically for the purpose of designing a SRA model for sovereign PD estimation.
The main phases of the rating model development are found in figure 10. All
steps will be described in detail apart from the final phase, extensions, which
includes possible additions to the model. Nonetheless, before turning specifi-
cally towards the SRA, the methodology of calibrating a PD scale from external
ratings will be reviewed.
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The most demanding part in rating model development is the data 
preparation and identification of economically meaningful factors 
Rating model development steps  
Design and  
Factor  
(Long-)List 
Definition 
Single- 
Factor 
Analysis 
Multi- 
Factor 
Analysis 
Calibration 
and 
Validation 
Extensions 
Data  
Generation  
and 
Cleansing 
• Definition of 
modular 
approach 
• Factor long-list 
definition 
• Database 
design 
• Bank analyst 
input 
• Testing of 
discriminatory 
power of single 
factors   
• Potentially testing 
of variations of the 
factors, e.g.  
var(factor),  
growth(factor),  
abs(factor)  
or more complex 
transformations 
e.g. based on 
graphical 
analyses 
• Factor rank-
correlation analysis 
(don’t  use  highly  
correlated factors) 
• Create factor short-
list (strong and not 
highly correlated) 
• Factor adjustment 
(for weight compa-
rability), i.e. factor 
transformation to 
[0,1], usually 
via Logit-transf. 
𝑋෨ ≔ 1 + 𝑒௔ା௕∙௑
ିଵ 
5%- and 95%-
quantiles of 𝑋 are 
mapped to 5% 
and 95%, 
respectively  
• Model selection: 
for a set of factor 
combinations:  
Regression to 
obtain multi-
factor model 
Select a sub-set 
of factor 
combinations 
with highest 
discriminatory 
power 
Among the 
strong models, 
choose the 
economically 
most meaningful  
• Model calibration 
• Model testing, e.g. 
outlier analysis  
• Downgrade 
factors 
• Parental and 
governmental 
support 
• Credit analyst 
override logic 
• Transfer risk (i.e. 
country risk for 
foreign currencies) 
• Loss given default 
model 
• EaD model 
• Data generation, 
i.e. collection of 
historical default 
and non-default 
observations 
attached with 
factor values 
(alternatively 
external ratings) 
• Data cleansing 
and verification 
Figure 10: Rating model development steps (Kuhn 2012, p. 17)
4.1 Calibratio of External Ratings t PD
The reason for calibrating to external ratings specifically and no other external
data source such as CDS spre ds, stems from the fact that we wish to map to
an external default frequency. Typically, such approaches are through-the-cycle
(TTC) oriented, i.e. long-run oriented, rather than point-in-time (PIT). CRAs
adopt a TTC methodology when constructing credit ratings, which makes them
the most suitable option to apply in our case. Nevertheless, having compared
the respective characteristics of the external market data sources in section 2.1.4,
it is clear that there is no leading proxy for sovereign credit risk.
As previously reviewed in section 2.4, the works of Orth (2011) on the EB
estimator will be utilized. In order to produce EB estimates, sovereign marginal
DR are obtained from S&P’s long-term credit ratings and default histories on
130 rated sovereigns between the period January 1975 and April 2011. The
fact that the set only contains 15 default events represents a typical case of
LDP. In order to estimate the prior in the EB methodology, data from S&P
Capital IQ on S&P’s default histories and ratings of North American public firms
between January 1981 and April 2011 will be used. Just as for the sovereign
credit ratings, the public firms’ ratings are long-term issuer credit ratings. The
corporate dataset is substantially larger containing 5355 rated firms, and 755
defaults over the time period.
However, in our case the data used to compute the EB estimator are limited to
pooled rating grades, measured on an ordinal rating scale of seven rating grades.
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This seven-point ordinal rating scale is not preferable to apply when calculating
EC, since a downgrade would imply a very large jump in capital requirement.
Therefore, a more fine granular scale is required, which is done by adding a (+)
or (-) to ratings ’AA’ to ’CCC’ of the rating scale in appendix section A, to
showcase relative standing within each rating category. Additionally, one of the
most important requirements of PD estimates is the property of monotonicity,
i.e. a better rating grade must have a lower PD estimate than a worse rating
grade. When using DR to estimate PDs, the resulting estimates may not always
possess this trait.
In order to obtain monotonicity as well as expanding the rating scale for (+)
and (-) grades, we will proceed from a method outlined by Erlenmaier (2011,
pp. 47-48). Erlenmaier (2011) firstly regresses the logarithm of calibrated PDs
(EB estimates in our case) to the ordinal rating scale, and secondly interpolates
in place of non-monotonic PDs, thus generating a monotonic PD curve. The
logarithmic function is applied since ln(PD) are approximately linear against
the ordinal rating scale. However, when re-transforming the logarithmic PDs
using the exponential function, resulting PDs may theoretically exceed 1. This
would imply that the PD exceeds 100%, which is clearly not feasible. In other
words, it is necessary to bound PDs within the interval (0, 1). This is obtained
by applying the logit function to PDs as a replacement of the logarithmic trans-
formation, since the logistic distribution function maps the regression to the
interval (0, 1).
The logit transform is defined as
logit (x) = ln
(
x
1− x
)
, (4.1)
where x1−x is called the odds ratio, i.e. the relation between probability of default
and probability of survival (Trueck and Rachev 2009, p. 22). The regression
performed can therefore be defined as
logit (EB) = β0 + β1ORS, (4.2)
where EB represents the EB estimates, ORS the ordinal rating scale, β0 the
intercept and β1 the coefficient for the ordinal rating scale. Next, we interpo-
late between non-zero EB estimates, and if necessary extrapolate for zero EB
estimates, typically including ratings above ’A’. The extrapolation is justified
since logit-transformed EB estimates are approximately linear with the ordinal
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rating scale. Ultimately, the inverse logit function is applied
logit−1 (x) =
1
1 + exp(−x) (4.3)
to obtain the calibrated PD scale. In coming sections, let the resulting PDs
corresponding to each rating category be denoted as ratings-implied probability
of default (RIPD).
4.2 Modular Design
Having calibrated external ratings to PDs, the rating model development begins
with designing the database. Firstly, four modular approaches will be developed
when designing the database. In order to maximize statistical and economic
relevance, each approach will consist of a homogeneous sub-segment. The nec-
essary selection criterion to include a sovereign in each development sample is
the existence and availability of external ratings. Since the primary interest is
to evaluate EU sovereigns and sovereigns in close geographical proximity, the
development samples will consist exclusively of such sovereigns.
The first approach is determined by World Bank’s country classification (World
Bank 2013), based on each sovereign’s gross national income per capita. The
development and validation samples are divided into sets of high income OECD
sovereigns and non-OECD sovereigns, which are depicted in the appendices B,
table 16. GIIIPS sovereigns as well as Cyprus and Slovenia are not included in
the sample.
In the second approach, detailed in appendices table 17, sovereign are divided
according to Bloomberg’s methodology of reserve currency and non-reserve cur-
rency. The classification of reserve currencies is based on International Mone-
tary Fund’s currency composition of official foreign exchange reserves (COFER)
classification (International Monetary Fund 2013). GIIIPS sovereigns as well as
Cyprus and Slovenia are not included in the sample.
The third approach consists of sovereigns which have been hit hardest by the
European sovereign-debt crisis, in terms of both growing government debt levels
as well as severely diminishing creditworthiness. The approach does not include
a validation sample, as it is specifically developed towards GIIIPS, Cyprus, and
Slovenia exposures. Table 18 in appendix section B provides an overview of the
approach.
The fourth approach combines the prior three approaches, i.e. the development
sample consists of sovereigns included in the development samples of three first
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approaches. Similarly, the validation sample consists of sovereigns included in
the two first approaches’ development samples. Table 19 in appendix section B
overviews the fourth approach.
Briefly commenting on the modular approaches, if GIIIPS, Cyprus and Slove-
nia were to be included in either the World Bank’s country classification and
IMF’s COFER classification approaches, the resulting PD estimates for GII-
IPS, Cyprus and Slovenia would be largely underrated in relation to RIPDs.
Therefore, these have been chosen as a separate sub-segment.
Moreover, transcontinental sovereigns such as Turkey are part of development
samples, because of the ever increasing relationship between the EU and Turkey.
Meanwhile, for instance Russia is chosen as part of the validation samples, as
the prospects of Russia embracing a stronger link than currently with the EU
are slim.
4.3 Factor Long-List and Data Generation
When constructing the factor long-list of potential factors indicating a sovereign’s
creditworthiness, both quantitative and qualitative categories must be taken into
account. Since SRA is applied, the aim is to replicate the TTC oriented exter-
nal ratings. S&P’s methodology reviewed in chapter 3 is based exclusively on
country-specific factors, implying that country-specific factors are of primary
interest as factor inputs. Moreover, S&P’s and Bloomberg’s methodology are
both based on economic, external, fiscal, monetary, and political indicators. In
addition to S&P’s and Bloomberg’s categories, Izzi et al. (2011) have compiled
a list of quantitative and qualitative categories, detailed in table 6.
Quantitative Qualitative
Banking System Debt Servicing Record
Current Account Economic Conditions
Debt Foreign Relations
Government Finance Stability of the Financial System
Growth Social and Political Conditions
Liquidity
Monetary Policy
Table 6: Categories for quantitative and qualitative factor long-list (Izzi et al.
2011).
The data on quantitative and qualitative factors have primarily been collected
from IMF and World Bank, in order to obtain a cohesive dataset. Using several
data sources may cause deviations in data. In addition, the data generation
includes the collection of external ratings for each included sovereign. Izzi et al.
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(2011) indicate the minimum data requirements of the SRA, for which the de-
velopment and validation sample should include at least 100 and 50 observations
respectively. In order to cope with the requirements of Izzi et al. (2011) as well
the IRB minimum requirements listed in section 2.2.4, annual data between
years 2000 − 2011 will be included in the samples, i.e. the datasets contain
one observation per year for a given sovereign. The available 2012 data will be
used out-of-sample for EC calculations. The restriction of annual data is mainly
dependent on the fact that several indicators are only published on an annual
basis. Conscious of the minimum requirements stated by Izzi et al. (2011), the
GIIIPS, Cyprus and Slovenia dataset does fulfill the requirements of at least
100 observations. Nonetheless, placing the sovereigns as part of a separate sub-
segment makes both economical and statistical sense, than having them as part
of the first and second approach.
It is also important to note that the time interval between factors and external
ratings are shifted according to the PD time horizon. Intuitively, since the aim
is to estimate PD one year from the evaluation of a sovereign, quantitative and
qualitative factors relative to year t will correspond to RIPD relative to year
t+ 1. Therefore, one must account for the one-year time lag, and construct the
dataset accordingly (Izzi et al. 2011).
The most demanding part of the rating model development is in fact data gen-
eration and identification of economically meaningful factors. The main chal-
lenges lie in the fact that certain sovereigns may have different macroeconomic
indicators that are not fully comparable with other sovereigns’ indicators. Fur-
thermore, it is not feasible to estimate a separate model for each sovereign,
due to the data restrictions previously mentioned. Therefore, it is of signifi-
cant importance to find indicators that are comparable across a sub-segment of
sovereigns. Potential testing of variations in factors, such as the use of variance
or absolute value of factors may be relevant for the single-factor analysis (SFA),
detailed in section 4.4.
Moreover, some degree of data cleansing is required to obtain reliable observa-
tions. For instance, observations with detected outliers should be removed, and
missing factor values may be filled by interpolation or result in a deletion of the
corresponding observation.
The long-list of factors is not provided in detail, since the vast majority are
filtered out in the SFA.
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4.4 Single-Factor Analysis
In short, the aim of SFA is to attain a factor shortlist explaining the credit-
worthiness of a sovereign. This is accomplished by initially performing a factor
transformation as well as using a measure of discriminatory power, namely the
shadow accuracy ratio (SAR). Additionally, factors should be checked for rep-
resentativeness as well as the existence of highly correlated factors.
4.4.1 Factor Transformation
The first part of SFA consists of transforming factors in order to attain more
insightful results in the multi-factor analysis (MFA), detailed in section 4.5.
Kuhn (2012), Erlenmaier (2011) and Zaalberg (2013) all suggest the use of the
previously introduced inverse logit function in section 4.1, which maps a factor
score on the real axis to (0, 1). The fact that all factors are given the same
range as well as diminishing effects of outliers, represent the two major reasons
to apply the transformation. When performing the inverse logit transformation,
factor distributions inversely related to creditworthiness are adjusted in order
to obtain an intuitive final model. In other words, factors are adjusted resulting
in higher factor scores being positively correlated with creditworthiness, and
therefore correspond to lower RIPD. In addition, the transformation is monotone
increasing, which preserves the ordering of the factor scores (Zaalberg 2013, p.
15).
In detail, equation 4.4 depicts the applied transformation, where parameters
a and b represent the horizontal translation and steepness of the transform
respectively.
f(x) =
1
1 + exp(a+ bx)
(4.4)
The parameters are determined separately for each factor, providing the best
possible fit according to the empirical distribution function of the factor scores.
Factors inversely related to creditworthiness receive parameters −a and −b to
adjust for positive relation with creditworthiness (Zaalberg 2013, p. 16).
Shadow Accuracy Ratio
Moving to the second part of SFA, Izzi et al. (2011) define SAR as a measure
of single-factor rank ordering power, i.e. a factor’s predictive power on a stand-
alone basis. In general, SAR compares single-factor scores to the ideal model,
which orders sovereigns in the best possible way according to RIPD. The closer a
factor is to the ideal model, the more useful the factor is for replicating external
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ratings, and subsequently receives a larger SAR value. A SAR near one implies
high discriminatory power, while a value near zero represents a factor with no
discriminatory power.
In order to compute SAR, the ranking power (RP) of a factor needs to be
calculated. This is accomplished by determining areas defined in figure 11 by the
random model curve, power curve, crystal ball curve, and perfect discriminatory
model curve (Izzi et al. 2011). For a single-factor, the power curve is obtained
by first ordering factor scores ascendingly. Next, for a certain factor score, the
sum of RIPDs of observations corresponding to lower or equal factor scores is
divided by the sum of RIPDs corresponding to all factor scores. The proportion
determined is then graphically plotted against the proportion of all observations
with lower or equal factor score. This procedure is done for each factor score,
thus constructing the power curve (Zaalberg 2013, p. 13).
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Figure 11: SAR of a single factor, recreated from Izzi et al. (2011).
The methodology behind the construction of the power curve may be formal-
ized by determining the shadow cumulative default frequency (SCDF), which
represents the y-axis in figure 11 as
SCDF1 =
RIPD1
n∑
j=1
RIPDj
(4.5)
SCDFi = SCDFi−1 +
RIPDi
n∑
j=1
RIPDj
, ∀ i = 2, . . . , n (4.6)
where n is the number of observations (Izzi et al. 2011).
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Furthermore, the crystal ball represents the ideal model. That is, if factor scores
have full discriminatory power, it would correspond to having a crystal ball and
predicting future creditworthiness of sovereigns flawlessly. In a scenario where
factor scores follow the crystal ball model, factor scores will be ordered inversely
to the ordering of RIPDs, since higher factor scores imply lower RIPD as a result
of the factor transformation (Zaalberg 2013, p. 14).
If factor scores have no discriminatory power, the random model will be immi-
nent. In such cases, the factor score of an observation will not determine any
sort of creditworthiness at all, therefore yielding a straight line with constant
slope when plotting SAR (Zaalberg 2013, p. 14).
The perfect discriminatory model curve is determined by calculating the shadow
default rate (SDR) as the average RIPD across the sub-segment:
SDR =
n∑
j=1
RIPDj
n
. (4.7)
It is now possible to determine RPfactor and RPcrystal ball as a ratio of several
areas:
RPfactor =
Area(A)
Area(A) +Area(B)
(4.8)
RPcrystal ball =
Area(C)
Area(C) +Area(B)
(4.9)
Ultimately, SARfactor is computed as the ratio betweenRPfactor andRPcrystal ball:
SARfactor =
RPfactor
RPcrystal ball
. (4.10)
A maximum SAR value of one would imply that the power curve is identical to
the crystal ball curve (Izzi et al. 2011).
4.4.2 Factor Rank-Correlation Analysis and Representativeness
Having selected a number of factors with high discriminatory power, one has to
make sure that the factors are not highly correlated. Therefore, the next step
is to perform a factor rank-correlation analysis. Each factor is evaluated on its
pairwise correlation with the other factors. The correlation level for which two
variables should be excluded is not rigid. Instead, it is of higher importance to
distinguish if highly correlated factors belong to the same information category
or are different measures in an economical sense (Izzi et al. 2011). In general,
one should be alarmed if two factors have a correlation of more than 75% with
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one another (Jo 2008, p. 22).
Furthermore, factor representativeness should be checked. Representativeness
indicates whether a factor represents a predictor of creditworthiness for an entire
homogeneous sub-segment. This analysis may for instance be performed by
comparing risk factor distributions of the development and validation sample
(Erlenmaier 2011, p. 62).
4.5 Multi-Factor Analysis
Having completed SFA and ultimately selected a factor shortlist according to
discriminatory power, factor-rank correlation, and representativeness, the next
step of the rating model development is the multi-factor analysis. The major
part of the MFA consists of regressing logit-transformed RIPDs to a subset of
the factor shortlist best replicating RIPDs, in order to obtain a multi-factor
model with factor-specific weights. In other words, the aim is to construct a
model for the discrete dependent variable logit(RIPD) based on the explanatory
subset of shortlist factors, while accounting for their interdependencies. Among
the strongest models, the economically most meaningful will be chosen (Kuhn
2012, p. 17). In addition, practitioners are often interested in determining
each factor’s influence on the external ratings within a specific sub-segment of
sovereigns. Consequently, a measure of influence will be constructed based on
the factor-specific weights.
4.5.1 Multiple Linear OLS Regression
Essentially, attention must first be given to model selection, which includes
choice of model type as well as determining the subset of factors included. With
regard to the choice of model type, the most frequently applied MFA technique
is multiple linear regression with logit-transformed external PDs as dependent
variable, and a set of explanatory factors. The logit transform fulfills the com-
patibility requirement of linear relationship assumed by the regression model,
as well as maintaining calibrated PDs within the interval (0, 1). Additionally,
a stepwise method is commonly used to determine the combination of factors
included in the model (Izzi et al. 2011).
Focusing on the stepwise method, the factors selected for the final model are
firstly chosen from the SFA produced shortlist of k factors. As a result, the
final model may consist of 2k possible factor combinations. If k is large, it is
recommended to utilize a stepwise method instead of using brute force to check
all possible combinations. A stepwise forward selection builds the model step by
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step, initially adding the factor yielding highest stand-alone predictive power.
The second factor is chosen based on the combined predictive power of the
first and second factor. The iteration continues until additional factors do not
yield a significant improvement of the model within a certain threshold. The
significance threshold in our analysis is set to 5%. Additionally, factors are only
added if its sign is intuitive. Since all factors have previously been transformed,
a higher factor score should correspond to a lower RIPD, i.e. factors are only
added they have a negative sign (Zaalberg 2013, pp. 17-18).
Focusing on the model type, the linear regression for SRA rating systems is
typically denoted:
logit(RIPDi) = β0 + β1xi,1 + . . .+ βmxi,m + i, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (4.11)
where xi,j is the score of factor j corresponding to observation i, i the i:th
observation residual, and β0, . . . , βm the regression coefficients, i.e. factor-
specific weights. The regression coefficients are estimated by means of ordi-
nary least squares (OLS), i.e. minimizing
∑n
i=1 
2
i . For the derivation of the
OLS estimator, we refer to section C in the appendices. Furthermore, three
essential stochastic assumptions of the residuals need to be fulfilled. Residuals
must namely be normally distributed, independent of each other as well as ho-
moskedastic, i.e. all residuals having the same standard deviation (Erlenmaier
2011, pp. 66-68).
When considering normality, residual distribution plots and statistical tests are
primarily used. In the event of statistical tests rejecting the hypothesis of nor-
mality, it is worth noting that estimators still are BLUE (best linear unbiased
estimator). In addition, if sample size is sufficiently large, convergence of es-
timates’ confidence intervals and related statistical tests is achieved, implying
that residuals are approximately normally distributed. However, violating the
assumption of homoskedasticity or independence is more severe. Both assump-
tions are checked by statistical tests on the covariance matrix of the residuals.
The derivation of the covariance matrix is found in appendix section C. Ho-
moskedasticity implies identical values of each entry of the diagonal, and inde-
pendence is present if non-diagonal entries are zeros. If either heteroskedasticity,
i.e. differing standard deviations of residuals, or autocorrelation, i.e. serially
correlated residuals, the structure of the covariance requires adjustment in or-
der to obtain consistent estimates (Erlenmaier 2011, pp. 68-69). The potential
adjustment is conducted through Matlab’s built-in function hac, which is a
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance estimator for OLS
coefficient estimates.
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4.5.2 Measuring Factor Influence
From the estimated factor-specific weights, i.e. regression coefficients, each fac-
tor’s influence on the external ratings may be determined. Erlenmaier (2011, pp.
70-71) details a commonly used method for measuring factor influence. Firstly,
an adjusted factor coefficient is constructed by multiplying a factor’s weight
by the factor’s standard deviation. Each factor’s influence is then determined
by mapping the adjusted factor coefficients to the interval [0, 1]. As a result,
the sum of the absolute value of all mapped coefficients should add up to one.
Interpreting the obtained coefficients, a coefficient xj depicts to which degree
it affects logit PDs predicted by the regression model, given all other mapped
factor coefficients xk,k 6=j are held constant. Formally, weight wj for measuring
influence of factor xj with regression coefficient βj is computed
wj =
w∗j
|w∗1 |+ . . .+ |w∗m|
, (4.12)
where the adjusted factor coefficient w∗j is calculated by the use of the standard
deviation operator denoted σ,
w∗j = βjσ(xj). (4.13)
4.6 Manual Adjustments and Model Calibration
Once the MFA has provided factor-specific weights from the regression as well
as each factor’s influence on the external ratings, the measure of influence may
be used for manual adjustments in order to maximize the fit to RIPDs, and
subsequently calibrating PDs from the derived model.
The reason to manually adjust estimates from the statistical model may stem
from inadequacies such as unsatisfactory representativeness of the development
sample, lacking empirical basis for the specific sub-segments or potential expert
judgement that differs from estimates. However, when performing a manual
adjustment, the model must not experience a significant decrease in discrimi-
natory power. This is ensured by applying the validation methods described in
section 4.7 (Erlenmaier 2011, p. 72).
In detail, the manual adjustment is performed by first constructing an aggre-
gated score Si from factor scores xi,m, and its respective factor weight wm for
measuring influence:
Si = w1xi,1 + . . .+ wmxi,m, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n (4.14)
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The aggregated score is then regressed against logit-transformed RIPDs:
logit(RIPDi) = c0 + c1Si + i, ∀ i = 1, . . . , n. (4.15)
Thus, the regression provides estimates for coefficients c0, which corresponds
to the average predicted logit PD of the sub-segment sample, and c1, which
measures the rate of which predicted logit PDs vary across the sample. If the
estimates for c0 and c1 are close to β0 and β∑ = β1 + . . .+βm in equation 4.11,
the general properties of the model will not have been vastly altered. Ultimately,
calibrated PDs are computed by applying the inverse logit transform to each
logit PD observation i predicted by the regression in equation 4.15 (Erlenmaier
2011, p. 72).
4.7 Model Validation
Turning our attention towards model validation, the SRA rating model develop-
ment does not allow for a significantly extensive validation process (Erlenmaier
2011, p. 74). Therefore, only the most essential validation measures are pre-
sented and utilized. Briefly itemized, the following validation tools are applied:
Outlier and Residual Analysis: Verification of stochastic assumptions on
the residuals, in addition to potential removal of observation outliers, which
may distort regression estimates.
Discriminatory Power: Computing SAR for calibrated development and val-
idation sample PDs.
PD Bucketing: Verification that calibrated PDs are within one or two rating
notches of the rating grades corresponding to RIPDs.
Formal Statistical Tests: Spiegelhalter test measuring the quality of the
rating model’s PD calibration.
The outlier and residual analysis is exhaustively based on multiple linear re-
gression residual and diagnostics plots. These tools are not specific to the SRA
development process, and will therefore not be reviewed in detail. Furthermore,
the discriminatory power measure SAR is reviewed in full detail in section 4.4.
Nevertheless, PD bucketing as well as the Spiegelhalter test require some atten-
tion.
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4.7.1 PD Bucketing
When banks develop rating models, the final step usually involves mapping
calibrated PDs to an internal master scale for internal use. The mapping is
done by creating buckets for the calibrated PDs, i.e. a certain interval for
the calibrated PDs correspond to a certain bucket (Zaalberg 2013, p. 20).
Following intuition, a simple mapping strategy based on intermediate values of
RIPDs as bucket thresholds is applied. For instance, if RIPD(′AAA′) = 1%
and RIPD(′AA+′) = 2%, then the threshold dividing the two rating buckets is
simply 1.5%. For validation purposes, it possible to verify that the calibrated
PD buckets are within one or two rating notches of rating grades corresponding
to RIPDs (Izzi et al. 2011). As for EC calculations, the bucket PD estimates
for the 2012 data sample is used as PD input parameter in the IRB formulas.
4.7.2 Spiegelhalter Test
Ultimately, the Spiegelhalter test is briefly reviewed. As a statistical test re-
flecting the quality of a rating model, the Spiegelhalter test is based around the
mean square error
MSE =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(RIPDi − PDi)2, (4.16)
where N is the number of observations, RIPDi is the RIPD corresponding
to observation i, and PDi is the calibrated PD for observation i. In general,
a low MSE is an indication of a well-performing rating model. Spiegelhalter
tests whether the observed MSE differs from its expected value. Formally, the
following hypotheses are tested:
H0 : MSE = E[MSE] (4.17)
H1 : MSE 6= E[MSE] (4.18)
Under H0, the expected value and variance of MSE is:
E[MSE] =
1
N
N∑
i=1
PDi · (1− PDi) (4.19)
V[MSE] =
1
N2
N∑
i=1
(1− 2PDi)2 · PDi · (1− PDi). (4.20)
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Under H0, the distribution of the standardized MSE, Zs, is approximately stan-
dard normally distributed according to the central limit theorem.
ZS =
MSE − E[MSE]
V[MSE]0.5
=
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
(RIPDi − PDi)2 − 1N
N∑
i=1
PDi · (1− PDi)√
1
N2
N∑
i=1
(1− 2PDi)2 · PDi · (1− PDi)
(4.21)
Therefore, a joint test can be applied at suitable significance level in order to
see if MSE is sufficiently small to suggest that the calibrated PDs equal true
PDs (Erlenmaier 2011, pp. 319-320).
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5 Empirical Findings and Model Analysis
The following section will detail the empirical findings, and review every aspect
of the model output. For intuition, the section will in the main follow the outline
of the rating model development.
5.1 Empirical Bayes PD Estimates
Firstly, EB estimates and the corresponding calibrated RIPDs will be displayed.
In table 7, default rates for sovereigns and corporates are listed together with
the resulting EB estimator. Regarding sovereign DR, one may initially note the
Sovereign DR (%) Corporate DR (%) Sovereign EB Estimator (%)
AAA 0.00 0.00 0.00
AA 0.00 0.00 0.00
A 0.00 0.06 0.06
BBB 0.00 0.20 0.20
BB 0.56 0.77 0.76
B 2.60 4.47 3.88
CCC-C 32.27 24.20 24.38
Table 7: One-year DR for sovereigns and corporates, as well as sovereign EB
estimates (%)
several zero default rates, which is an unsatisfactory feature considering that
CDS spreads are traded for highly-rated sovereigns, i.e. there exists credit risk
for exposures towards such sovereigns. In order to enforce more conservative
estimates, corporate DR are used as the prior to attain EB estimates. Due
to the sovereign sample size, which is small relative to the corporate sample,
one may clearly see that the corporate DR dominates the EB estimates. This
follows from the nature of Bayesian analysis. However, EB estimates for ’B’-
rated sovereigns are not as close to corporate DR as other rating grades, since
we have reasonable amount of information for ’B’-rated sovereigns. There exists
a few defaults in the sample of ’B’-rated sovereigns, in addition to not having
too few ’B’-rated sovereigns overall in the sample. In general, the EB estimator
enforces a reasonable degree of conservatism to highly rated obligors.
With regard to the final RIPD estimates, the fine granular RIPD scale as well
as logit-transformed RIPDs are displayed in figure 12. Also, the resulting RIPD
scale is more detailedly defined in table 8. A monotonic PD scale is obtained
as well as extrapolated estimates for zero EB estimates. The estimates from the
extrapolation are a result of the logit-transformed RIPDs approximative linear
relationship with the ordinal rating scale, shown by the best fitted least-squares.
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Calibrated RIPD (%)
AAA 0.0044
AA+ 0.0074
AA 0.0125
AA- 0.0211
A+ 0.0356
A 0.0600
A- 0.0896
BBB+ 0.1339
BBB 0.2000
BBB- 0.3123
BB+ 0.4875
BB 0.7600
BB- 1.3152
B+ 2.2669
B 3.8800
B- 6.3548
CCC+ 10.2400
CCC 16.0920
CCC- 24.3800
CC 31.8030
Table 8: Calibrated RIPD scale (%)
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Figure 12: Calibrated RIPD scale and logit-transformed RIPDs.
5.2 Significant MFA Factors
Next, the significant factors included in the MFA of each modular approach as
well as results on each factor’s discriminatory power will be presented. In table 9,
having excluded observations outliers, the factors included in the MFA of each
modular approach are listed. Notably, GDP per capita is the only indicator
part of all approaches. There exist two factors which have been adjusted in
respect to their raw data format, namely absolute deviation inflation and 3Y
GDP growth volatility. Regarding the first factor, the possibility of a sovereign
having negative inflation exists. In order to facilitate that negative inflation
does not imply a higher creditworthiness, while maintaining that high inflation
implies low creditworthiness, one may set an optimal level of inflation rate.
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The factor absolute deviation inflation may then be calculated by applying the
absolute value to the difference between the optimal level and a sovereign’s
inflation rate. Furthermore, 3Y GDP growth volatility is calculated by taking
the standard deviation of the previous three years of GDP growth. The factor
has been found to have substantially larger discriminatory power than using the
raw yearly GDP growth data.
Modular Approach 1: World Bank’s Country Classification
OECD Non-OECD
Absolute Deviation Inflation (%) Absolute Deviation Inflation (%)
Constant GDP per Capita (USD) Constant GDP per Capita (USD)
EIU Political Risk Score Non-Performing Loans (% Total Gross Loans)
Modular Approach 2: IMF’s COFER Classification
RC NRC
Absolute Deviation Inflation (%) Absolute Deviation Inflation (%)
Constant GDP per Capita (USD) Constant GDP per Capita (USD)
EIU Political Risk Score Non-Performing Loans (% Total Gross Loans)
EIU Political Risk Score
Modular Approach 3: GIIIPS, Cyprus & Slovenia
Constant GDP per Capita (USD)
Gross National Savings (% GDP)
Non-Performing Loans (% Total Gross Loans)
Modular Approach 4: Full Dataset
Absolute Deviation Inflation (%)
Constant GDP per Capita (USD)
3Y GDP Growth Volatility (%)
Non-Performing Loans (% Total Gross Loans)
EIU Political Risk Score
Table 9: List of significant indicators in MFA
Note that certain manual adjustments have been made to the choice of factors
by the automatic stepwise method. For instance, the factor gross government
debt has relatively high discriminatory power and is included by the stepwise
method for OECD and RC approaches. However, in spite of improving the
model sample, the factor distorts the validation sample. As a result, the factor
lacks sufficient representativeness for the sub-segment, and is therefore excluded
from the MFA. In addition, the stepwise method includes the EIU political risk
score instead of GDP per capita for the non-OECD sample, since EIU provides
better fit for the model sample. Replacing the EIU political risk score with
GDP per capita, the model sample performance is not altered much. However,
the validation sample sees a significant improvement, which justifies the switch
between the factors. Note that it is not possible to include both factors for the
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non-OECD model sample, since one of the factors will not be significant.
Furthermore, in table 10 each factor’s ranking power and SAR is listed. In
addition, the ranking power of the crystal ball approach is also listed, since it
is used to compute SAR. In the main, SAR values for significant factors lie
in the range 0.6 − 1, which provides sufficient discrimination towards RIPDs.
Nevertheless, having a number of factors with high discriminatory power does
not automatically render sufficiently good results in the MFA. The interactions
between factors are vital, which strongly impacts factor-specific weights.
Approach 1 - OECD RPfactor RPcrystal ball SARfactor
Absolute Deviation Inflation 0.4612 0.6019 0.7663
Constant GDP per Capita 0.5928 0.6019 0.9850
EIU Political Risk Score 0.5895 0.6019 0.9794
Approach 1 - Non-OECD RPfactor RPcrystal ball SARfactor
Absolute Deviation Inflation 0.4013 0.6190 0.6483
Constant GDP per Capita 0.5271 0.6190 0.8516
Non-Performing Loans 0.3999 0.6190 0.6460
Approach 2 - RC RPfactor RPcrystal ball SARfactor
Absolute Deviation Inflation 0.4884 0.6061 0.8057
Constant GDP per Capita 0.5947 0.6061 0.9811
EIU Political Risk Score 0.5830 0.6061 0.9618
Approach 2 - NRC RPfactor RPcrystal ball SARfactor
Absolute Deviation Inflation 0.5703 0.7209 0.7910
Constant GDP per Capita 0.6676 0.7209 0.9260
Non-Performing Loans 0.5577 0.7209 0.7737
EIU Political Risk Score 0.6819 0.7209 0.9459
Approach 3 - GIIIPS RPfactor RPcrystal ball SARfactor
Constant GDP per Capita 0.9351 0.9755 0.9586
Gross National Savings 0.9719 0.9755 0.9963
Non-Performing Loans 0.9715 0.9755 0.9959
Approach 4 - Full Dataset RPfactor RPcrystal ball SARfactor
Absolute Deviation Inflation 0.7340 0.8258 0.8888
Constant GDP per Capita 0.8053 0.8258 0.9752
3Y GDP Growth Volatility 0.6749 0.8258 0.8172
Non-Performing Loans 0.7426 0.8258 0.8992
EIU Political Risk Score 0.8108 0.8258 0.9819
Table 10: SFA results: RP and SAR of significant MFA factors.
Additionally, the factors listed in table 9 and 10 all have sufficient represen-
tativeness for each sub-segment, and have passed the factor-rank correlation
analysis.
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Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 Approach 4
OECD Non-OECD RC NRC GIIIPS Full Dataset
(Intercept) -8.1391∗∗∗ -6.1912∗∗∗ -8.2142∗∗∗ -4.8019∗∗∗ -7.1616∗∗∗ -6.7713∗∗∗
(0.2246) (0.5655) (0.2714) (0.6794) (0.6530) (0.5078)
Constant GDP per Capita -1.4234∗∗∗ -1.9153∗∗∗ -2.2831∗∗∗ -1.8836∗ -1.3045∗ -0.9611∗
(0.3275) (0.4897) (0.3861) (0.7872) (0.6061) (0.4239)
Absolute Deviation Inflation -0.7343∗∗∗ -1.7920∗∗∗ -0.9019∗∗∗ -1.2579∗ -1.3650∗∗
(0.2246) (0.4183) (0.2187) (0.5203) (0.4227)
EIU Political Risk Score -1.7787∗∗∗ -0.9939∗∗∗ -3.8930∗∗∗ -4.1823∗∗∗
(0.2882) (0.2881) (1.0321) (0.6571)
Non-Performing Loans -1.2990∗∗∗ -1.0889∗∗ -3.4192∗∗∗ -1.2629∗∗∗
(0.3696) (0.3528) (0.6513) (0.3385)
Gross National Savings -3.4069∗∗∗
(0.6377)
3Y GDP Growth Volatility -0.4921∗
(0.2173)
R2 0.820 0.568 0.810 0.864 0.587 0.852
N 166 125 120 174 76 368
Standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in brackets.
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
Table 11: MFA results: Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation corrected MFA regression output
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5.3 MFA Regression, Measure of Influence and Calibra-
tion
In the following section, results obtained from the MFA are detailed. More
specifically, table 11 displays the multiple linear OLS regression output, includ-
ing intercepts, regression coefficients, factor significance levels p, goodness-of-fit
R2 as well as number of observations N of each modular approach. Most no-
tably, the GIIIPS and non-OECD model samples provide low R2. The GIIIPS
model sample includes the observation of Greece’s default, which severely di-
minishes the overall regression fit. In the end, the inclusion of the observation is
justified since it provides more accurate factor-specific weights when computing
PD for 2012 data. The non-OECD model sample consists of mainly low-rated
sovereigns, and the low R2 indicates that factors indicative of default seem to
vary between these sovereigns. This is evident in table 10, since non-OECD SAR
values are significantly lower in comparison to other approaches. The segment
may benefit if divided into sub-segments, such as upper income non-OECD,
middle income non-OECD and lower income non-OECD sovereigns. However,
in such a case the issue of number of observations is imminent, as well as the
fact that several non-OECD sovereigns have only recently began receiving exter-
nal ratings. Similarly, the GIIIPS sample only contains 76 observations, which
is not optimal. Nonetheless, including these particular sovereigns as part of
OECD, non-OECD, RC and NRC would cause distortions in terms of deter-
mining which explanatory factors to include, and their respective weight in the
MFA.
Furthermore, table 12 overviews factor regression coefficients xj as well as each
factor’s influence wj . Having accounted for factors’ standard deviation, one may
see that the influence of factors differ from the regression coefficients. For in-
stance, in the non-OECD and NRC approach, absolute deviation inflation and
non-performing loans nearly have the same influence, but the latter is given
a notably smaller regression coefficient. This is due to non-performing loans
having a larger standard deviation across the set of observations than abso-
lute deviation inflation, therefore implying a larger factor weight of influence.
Also notable in the GIIIPS approach, is that gross national savings receives a
larger influence weight than non-performing loans, in contrast to the regression
coefficients which are reversely related.
Using the factor influence weights, the regressions which calibrate PD estimates
are listed in table 13. One may discern only slight deviations to R2 in com-
parison to table 11, which is promising. In general, the intercepts are only
slightly altered, indicating that the intercept of the MFA regression is nearly
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Approach 1 - OECD xj wj
Absolute Deviation Inflation -0.7343 0.1702
Constant GDP per Capita -1.4234 0.3618
EIU Political Risk Score -1.7787 0.4680
Approach 1 - Non-OECD xj wj
Absolute Deviation Inflation -1.7920 0.3270
Constant GDP per Capita -1.9153 0.3467
Non-Performing Loans -1.5044 0.3263
Approach 2 - RC xj wj
Absolute Deviation Inflation -0.9019 0.2082
Constant GDP per Capita -2.2831 0.5434
EIU Political Risk Score -0.9939 0.2483
Approach 2 - NRC xj wj
Absolute Deviation Inflation -1.2579 0.1354
Constant GDP per Capita -1.8836 0.2230
Non-Performing Loans -1.0889 0.1373
EIU Political Risk Score -3.8930 0.5043
Approach 3 - GIIIPS xj wj
Constant GDP per Capita -1.3045 0.1546
Gross National Savings -3.4069 0.4266
Non-Performing Loans -3.4192 0.4188
Approach 4 - Full Dataset xj wj
Absolute Deviation Inflation -1.3650 0.1391
Constant GDP per Capita -0.9611 0.1254
3Y GDP Growth Volatility -0.4921 0.0578
Non-Performing Loans -1.2629 0.1470
EIU Political Risk Score -4.1823 0.5307
Table 12: MFA results: Comparison of regression coefficient weights xj and
factor influence weights wj of significant MFA factors
optimally estimated according to the fit to RIPDs. In terms of the OECD and
RC approach, the intercept signals a low average predicted PD for sovereigns in
relation to for instance non-OECD and NRC, which receive an intercept closer to
zero indicating a higher average predicted PD. This is in line with expectations,
since OECD and RC consist of a larger proportion of highly rated sovereigns in
comparison to the sets of non-OECD and NRC. The full dataset has the largest
deviation in terms of intercept, which suggests that the approach required fur-
ther fitting to RIPDs. Moreover, the full dataset exhibits a score indicating
that the set contains sovereigns rated across the entire rating scale. Reversely,
the OECD score is less than half of the full datasets score, which relates to the
fact that it exhaustively contains highly rated sovereigns. Similarly, at some
point between 2000− 2011 the NRC and GIIIPS set contains both highly rated
sovereigns in addition to lower rated, thus indicating a score similar to the full
dataset.
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Approach 1 Approach 2 Approach 3 Approach 4
OECD Non-OECD RC NRC GIIIPS Full Dataset
(Intercept) -8.089∗∗∗ -6.2941∗∗∗ -8.1874∗∗∗ -4.6928∗∗∗ -7.1514∗∗∗ -6.5175∗∗∗
(0.0588) (0.0954) (0.0687) (0.0805) (0.1804) (0.0508)
Score -3.8929∗∗∗ -5.1748∗∗∗ -4.1623∗∗∗ -8.0234∗∗∗ -8.0848∗∗∗ -8.1107∗∗∗
(0.1423) (0.40935) (0.1855) (0.2429) (0.7879) (0.1774)
R2 0.820 0.565 0.810 0.864 0.587 0.851
N 166 125 120 174 76 368
Standard errors in brackets.
*** p < 0.001
Table 13: MFA results: Manual adjustment regression output
5.4 Model Validation
Having analyzed the MFA output, the next step is to cast an eye on the model
validation results, which essentially measure the performance of the different
modular approaches. As a first measure, the discriminatory power provides an
indication of model performance, displayed in table 14. However, one must note
that the performance of calibrated PDs are tested in a discriminatory manner,
and not in absolute terms of deviations from RIPD. Upon first sight, OECD,
RC, Full Dataset and GIIIPS perform very well according to the SAR val-
ues. Notably, non-OECD and NRC perform similarly well in-sample, but worse
out-of-sample. This possibly indicates that the set of indicators are not suit-
able for certain sovereigns part of the sub-segment or estimated factor-specific
weights require adjustment. One should note that the validation samples con-
tains sovereigns not part of EU region. Applying a discriminatory measure to
2012 samples would not yield sufficiently indicative results, due to the limited
number of observations.
Approach SARmodel SARvalidation
OECD 0.9842 0.9533
Non-OECD 0.8836 0.6629
RC 0.9844 0.9093
NRC 0.9495 0.7076
GIIIPS 0.9996
Full Dataset 0.9824 0.9160
Table 14: Validation results: Discriminatory power of model and validation
samples
A second validation measure is the verification of rating class deviations of
PD buckets, which illuminates the performance of calibrated PDs in absolute
terms. The results in table 15 indicate that OECD and RC approaches perform
very well, both in and out-of-sample as well as for computing PD based on 2012
data. Furthermore, the measure confirms that non-OECD and NRC approaches
perform adequately in-sample, but lacks out-of-sample performance. In terms of
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the full dataset approach, the performance is not as strong as the OECD or RC
approaches, but delivers better results overall in comparison to non-OECD and
NRC. One may be crude, and conclude that the approach delivers a weighted
performance of OECD/RC and non-OECD/NRC. Interestingly, even though
the discriminatory power of the GIIIPS approach was very high, calibrated PDs
evidently do not perform as well in absolute terms. In particular the results
from 2012 sample are notable, in which PD estimates for Greece, Cyprus and
Spain lie outside two rating notches. Since the GIIIPS sample only contains
eight sovereigns, this affects the results in table 15 substantially.
Model Sample Validation Sample 2012 Sample
Within One Within Two Within One Within Two Within One Within Two
OECD 90.96 100 87.50 98.86 86.36 100
Non-OECD 59.20 88.80 38.36 58.90 40.91 68.18
RC 92.50 100 90.91 97.73 87.50 93.75
NRC 69.54 82.76 47.01 64.10 46.67 70
GIIIPS 59.21 81.58 50 62.50
Full Dataset 71.20 86.96 56.52 77.02 51.85 66.67
Table 15: Validation results: Verification of PD bucket sample within one or
two rating class deviations (%)
In terms of the Spiegelhalter test, all samples except the GIIIPS model sam-
ple pass the test when applying a significance level of 5 %. This is due to the
inclusion of the observation corresponding to the default of Greece in the GII-
IPS model sample, which receives a significantly lower calibrated PD than the
corresponding RIPD. Again, the inclusion of the observation is justified, since
removing it from the sample decreases accuracy when computing PDs for the
2012 sample.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This thesis aimed to estimate economic capital (EC) for sovereign exposures
within a found internal ratings-based (FIRB) model framework, by estimating
a sovereign’s probability of default (PD) based on both quantitative and qual-
itative factors according to the shadow rating approach (SRA). Standard and
Poor’s (S&P’s) current sovereign rating methodology as well as Bloomberg’s
SRSK model represented benchmark methodologies. The developed PD model
was tested on four different modular approaches consisting of six model sam-
ples and five validation samples. The samples were divided according to World
Bank’s country classification, IMF’s COFER classification, GIIIPS and closely
related sovereigns, as well as the entire dataset at hand. The model was evalu-
ated by employing validation procedures, namely the SAR measuring discrimi-
natory power, verification through PD buckets, and the statistical Spiegelhalter
test. The results indicate that OECD and RC datasets perform very well overall,
while non-OECD and NRC perform adequately within the model sample, but
not as well for the validation sample. The segments may benefit from a more
fine granular division into sub-segments, mindful of obtaining a substantially
large set of observations. Furthermore, GIIIPS in general provide reliable re-
sults, but special attention should be given to the performance of PD estimates
in absolute terms. The full dataset performs adequately overall, but grouping
sub-segments such as OECD sovereigns provide more accurate estimates. In the
main, economic, monetary and political factors as well as banking sector health
are found to best replicate external ratings.
It may be possible to obtain performance enhancements by classifying sovereigns
according to the rating scale, i.e. sovereigns currently rated ’AAA’-’A’ should be
grouped together. However, in such approaches there is no economical relevance
other than the creditworthiness opinionated by the CRA.
In regards to alternative sovereign credit risk practices, the reason for calibrating
to external ratings specifically was chosen primarily due to its suitability for EC
calculations, and the aim of mapping to an external default frequency due to the
scarcity of sovereign defaults historically. Other sovereign credit risk practices,
such as the widespread CDS-based models might represent more accurate short-
term PD estimates. However, implied PD estimates from CDS spreads are
severely more volatile than credit ratings, which would imply large fluctuations
in capital requirements from year to year. For the purpose of calculating EC,
banks do not find volatile PD estimates a pleasant feature.
In terms of model uncertainty, the calibrated RIPD scale and the methodol-
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ogy behind it represents one such area. LDP PDs in general hold a certain
level of uncertainty, since the objective is to estimate PDs including a degree
of conservatism. Similarly, one may contest the degree of conservatism of the
EB estimator for sovereign PD estimation. In addition, obtaining RIPD esti-
mates for (+) and (-) ratings using interpolation involves a certain degree of
uncertainity.
Nonetheless, a major issue discussed in section 2.1.3, is the fact that empirical
studies have provided conflicting conclusions on sovereign default determinants.
There simply does not exist a set of common and consistent determinants for
default, but rather a complex range of conditional circumstances that may cause
default. Hence, the thesis’ conclusions regarding the indicators for each sub-
segment may not be seen as general facts in terms of determinants of sovereign
default. Nevertheless, the thesis’ results clarifies which indicators are most
important to take into account when replicating sovereign external ratings.
Further studies towards sharpening the tools for SRA rating development may
closer investigate panel type correlations models as a substitute for the multi-
ple linear OLS regression in order to incorporate correlations with respect to
time of observations. In addition, alternative measures for factor influence, and
manual adjustments may be desirable to develop. PIT adjustments to external
TTC ratings could also be of interest to explore further. Nevertheless, it is the
author’s hope that the reader has gained insight into the topic of sovereign SRA
model development, and that further attention will be given to studying the
field of sovereign credit risk.
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Appendices
A S&P’s Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings
Table 3
Long-Term Issuer Credit Ratings*
Category Definition
AAA
An obligor rated 'AAA' has extremely strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. 'AAA' is the highest issuer credit rating
assigned by Standard & Poor's.
AA
An obligor rated 'AA' has very strong capacity to meet its financial commitments. It differs from the highest-rated obligors only to a
small degree.
A
An obligor rated 'A' has strong capacity to meet its financial commitments but is somewhat more susceptible to the adverse effects
of changes in circumstances and economic conditions than obligors in higher-rated categories.
BBB
An obligor rated 'BBB' has adequate capacity to meet its financial commitments. However, adverse economic conditions or
changing circumstances are more likely to lead to a weakened capacity of the obligor to meet its financial commitments.
BB; B; CCC; and
CC
Obligors rated 'BB', 'B', 'CCC', and 'CC' are regarded as having significant speculative characteristics. 'BB' indicates the least degree
of speculation and 'CC' the highest. While such obligors will likely have some quality and protective characteristics, these may be
outweighed by large uncertainties or major exposures to adverse conditions.
BB
An obligor rated 'BB' is less vulnerable in the near term than other lower-rated obligors. However, it faces major ongoing
uncertainties and exposure to adverse business, financial, or economic conditions which could lead to the obligor's inadequate
capacity to meet its financial commitments.
B
An obligor rated 'B' is more vulnerable than the obligors rated 'BB', but the obligor currently has the capacity to meet its financial
commitments. Adverse business, financial, or economic conditions will likely impair the obligor's capacity or willingness to meet its
financial commitments.
CCC
An obligor rated 'CCC' is currently vulnerable, and is dependent upon favorable business, financial, and economic conditions to
meet its financial commitments.
CC An obligor rated 'CC' is currently highly vulnerable.
R
An obligor rated 'R' is under regulatory supervision owing to its financial condition. During the pendency of the regulatory
supervision the regulators may have the power to favor one class of obligations over others or pay some obligations and not others.
Please see Standard & Poor's issue credit ratings for a more detailed description of the effects of regulatory supervision on specific
issues or classes of obligations.
SD and D
An obligor rated 'SD' (selective default) or 'D' is in payment default on one or more of its financial obligations (rated or unrated)
unless Standard & Poor's believes that such payments will be made within five business days, irrespective of any grace period. The
'D' rating also will be used upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition or the taking of similar action if payments on a financial
obligation are jeopardized. A 'D' rating is assigned when Standard & Poor's believes that the default will be a general default and
that the obligor will fail to pay all or substantially all of its obligations as they come due. An 'SD' rating is assigned when Standard
& Poor's believes that the obligor has selectively defaulted on a specific issue or class of obligations, but it will continue to meet its
payment obligations on other issues or classes of obligations in a timely manner. A selective default includes the completion of a
distressed exchange offer, whereby one or more financial obligation is either repurchased for an amount of cash or replaced by
other instruments having a total value that is less than par.
NR An issuer designated 'NR' is not rated.
*The ratings from 'AA' to 'CCC' may be modified by the addition of a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show relative standing within the major rating categories.
2. Short-Term Issuer Credit Ratings
www.standardandpoors.com/ratingsdirect 7
979212 | 200000027
Standard & Poor's Ratings Definitions
Figure 13: S&P’s long-term issuer credit ratings (Standard and Poor’s 2012, p.
7).
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B Modular Sample Approaches
Modular Approach 1
High Income OECD Non-OECD
Development Sample Validation Sample Development Sample Validation Sample
Austria Australia Albania Brazil
Belgium Canada Belarus Egypt
Czech Republic Chile Bosnia & Herzegovina India
Denmark Israel Bulgaria Kazakhstan
Estonia Japan Croatia Peru
Finland New Zealand Hungary Russia
France South Korea Latvia Uruguay
Germany USA Lithuania
Luxembourg Macedonia
Netherlands Malta
Norway Montenegro
Poland Romania
Slovakia Serbia
Sweden Turkey
Switzerland Ukraine
United Kingdom
166 Observations 88 Observations 125 Observations 73 Observations
Table 16: Approach 1: World Bank’s country classification (World Bank 2013)
Modular Approach 2
Reserve Currency Non-Reserve Currency
Development Sample Validation Sample Development Sample Validation Sample
Austria Australia Albania Brazil
Belgium Canada Belarus Chile
Estonia Japan Bosnia & Herzegovina Egypt
Finland USA Bulgaria India
France Croatia Israel
Germany Czech Republic Kazakhstan
Luxembourg Denmark New Zealand
Malta Hungary Peru
Netherlands Latvia Russia
Slovakia Lithuania South Korea
Switzerland Macedonia Uruguay
United Kingdom Montenegro
Norway
Poland
Romania
Serbia
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
120 Observations 44 Observations 174 Observations 117 Observations
Table 17: Approach 2: IMF’s COFER classification (International Monetary
Fund 2013)
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Modular Approach 3
Development Sample
Cyprus Italy
Greece Portugal
Iceland Slovenia
Ireland Spain
84 Observations
Table 18: Approach 3: GIIIPS, Cyprus and Slovenia
Modular Approach 4
Development Sample Validation Sample
Albania Lithuania Australia
Austria Luxembourg Brazil
Belarus Macedonia Canada
Belgium Malta Chile
Bosnia & Herzegovina Montenegro Egypt
Bulgaria Netherlands India
Croatia Norway Israel
Cyprus Poland Japan
Czech Republic Portugal Kazakhstan
Denmark Romania New Zealand
Estonia Serbia Peru
Finland Slovakia Russia
France Slovenia South Korea
Germany Spain USA
Greece Sweden
Hungary Switzerland
Iceland Turkey
Ireland Ukraine
Italy United Kingdom
Latvia
368 Observations 161 Observations
Table 19: Approach 4: Combination of approach 1, 2 and 3
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C Derivation of OLS Estimator and Covariance
Matrix
Let N be the number of observations, k the number of explanatory factors, and
βˆ the OLS estimator minimizing the sum of all 2. The linear regression model
may then be denoted in the following matrix notation:
Y = Xβ + , (C.1)
where Y , β and  are vectors of size N × 1, k × 1, N × 1 respectively, while X
is a N × k matrix. The OLS estimator minimizes T :
T  = (Y −Xβ)T (Y −Xβ) = Y TY − 2βTXTY + βTXTXβ. (C.2)
From C.2, the derivative of T  with respect to βT is then given by:
∂T 
∂βT
= 2XTY +XTXβ. (C.3)
Setting ∂T /∂βT = 0, provides the OLS estimator βˆ:
βˆ =
(
XTX
)−1
XTY (C.4)
(Zaalberg 2013, p. 74).
Assuming V ar() = σ2I, i.e.  are uncorrelated and homoskedastic, the OLS
estimator is unbiased:
E(βˆ) = E
((
XTX
)−1
XTY
)
=
(
XTX
)−1
XTE(Y ) =
(
XTX
)−1
XTXβ = β (C.5)
It is possible to retrieve the covariance matrix V ar(βˆ) through the following
equations:
βˆ − β = (XTX)−1XT (Xβ + )− β = (XTX)−1XT  (C.6)
(
βˆ − β
)(
βˆ − β
)T
=
(
XTX
)−1
XT TX
(
XTX
)−1
(C.7)
The covariance matrix V ar(βˆ) can now be calculated as follows:
V ar(βˆ) =
(
XTX
)−1
XTE
(
T
)
X
(
XTX
)−1
=
= σ2
(
XTX
)−1
XTX
(
XTX
)−1
= σ2
(
XTX
)−1 (C.8)
(Zaalberg 2013, p. 26).
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